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Abstract  
One evolving and increasingly important means of verification of a State’s 
compliance with its international safeguards obligations involves the application of 
publicly available commercial satellite imagery. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) views commercial satellite imagery as “a particularly valuable open source of 
information.”  In 2001, the IAEA established an in-house Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit 
(SIAU) to provide an independent capability for "the exploitation of satellite imagery 
which involves imagery analysis, including correlation/fusion with other sources (open 
source, geospatial, and third party). Commercial satellite imagery not only supports 
onsite inspection planning and verification of declared activities,” but perhaps its most 
important role is that it also “increases the possibility of detecting proscribed nuclear 
activities.”  
Analysis of imagery derived from low-earth-orbiting observation satellites has a 
long history dating to the early 1960s in the midst of the Cold War era. That experience 
provides a sound basis for effectively exploiting the flood of now publicly available 
commercial satellite imagery data that is now within reach of anyone with Internet 
access. This paper provides insights on the process of imagery analysis, together with 
the use of modern geospatial tools like Google Earth, and highlights a few of the 
potential pitfalls that can lead to erroneous analytical conclusions. A number of 
illustrative exemplar cases are reviewed to illustrate how academic researchers 
(including those within the European Union’s Joint Research Centre) and others in Non-
Governmental Organizations are now applying commercial satellite imagery in 
combination with other open source information in innovative and effective ways for 
various verification purposes.  
The international constellation of civil imaging satellites is rapidly growing larger, 
thereby improving the temporal resolution (reducing the time between image 
acquisitions), but the satellites are also significantly improving in capabilities with regard 
to both spatial and spectral resolutions.  The significant increase, in both the volume and 
type of raw imagery data that these satellites can provide, and the ease of access to it, 
will likely lead to a concomitant increase in new non-proliferation relevant knowledge as 
well. Many of these new developments were previously unanticipated, and they have 
already had profound effects beyond what anyone would have thought possible just a 
few years ago. Among those include multi-satellite, multi-sensor synergies deriving from 
the diversity of sensors and satellites now available, which are exemplified in a few case 
studies.  
This report also updates earlier work on the subject by this author and explains 
how the many recent significant developments in the commercial satellite imaging 
domain will play an ever increasingly valuable role for open source nuclear 
nonproliferation monitoring and verification in the future.   
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1. Introduction  
One steadily improving means of verification of a State’s compliance with its 
obligations involves the application of publicly available commercial satellite imagery. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) views commercial satellite imagery as “a 
particularly valuable open source of information.1 In 2001, the IAEA established an in-
house Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit (SIAU) to provide an independent capability for 
“The exploitation of satellite imagery which involves imagery analysis, including 
correlation/fusion with other sources (open source, geospatial, and third party).2,3 Since 
then, commercial satellite imagery “has become one of the most important information 
sources the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards has for remotely monitoring nuclear sites 
and activities.” 4  It also “increases the possibility of detecting proscribed nuclear 
activities,” while also providing an efficient means to support onsite inspection planning 
and verification of declared activities.5 
 
Analysis of imagery derived from orbiting earth observation satellites has a long 
history dating to the early 1906s during the Cold War era, and provides a sound basis 
for effectively exploiting the flood of commercial satellite imagery data that now made 
available to anyone with Internet access. This paper provides insights on the process of 
imagery analysis, together with the use of modern geospatial tools, and highlights a few 
of the potential pitfalls that can lead to erroneous conclusions. A number of illustrative 
exemplar cases are reviewed to illustrate how academic researchers (including those 
within the European Union’s Joint Research Centre) and others in Non-Governmental 
Organizations are now applying commercial satellite imagery in combination with other 
open source information in innovative and effective ways for various verification 
purposes. 
 
Although commercial satellite imagery has already been proven to be an effective 
and accepted means for nuclear monitoring, verification, and mission planning for IAEA 
safeguards purposes6, it is still a relatively new “open-source” technology for routine 
information collection and analysis for such purposes.  Commercial satellite imagery (and 
its requisite processing and analysis) is continuing to evolve and advance as a result of 
radically new improvements in terms of spatial, spectral, and temporal resolutions from 
increasingly diverse and rapidly growing international satellite constellations. 7  
Commercial satellite imagery, although not a stand-alone open-source panacea, remains 
a unique verification information source technology that provides an optimal non-
intrusive capability to remotely “peer over the fence” to obtain unique information from 
otherwise inaccessible areas, anywhere on earth, on a consistently repetitive basis. 
Improved means of access to this multi-resolution imagery diversity (with rapid revisits 
for global surveillance in near-real time) will increasingly also provide a new basis for 
open-source information augmentation with previously unexpected synergistic effects.8,9   
 
This report: 1) reviews some key elements of that technologically driven 
geospatial (r)evolution, 2) updates earlier work on the subject by this author,10 and 3) 
explains how commercial satellite imagery will play an ever increasingly important role 
for nuclear nonproliferation monitoring and verification in the future. 
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2. A Short Retrospective: From CORONA to Commercial 
Remote sensing from space-based orbital platforms for information collection had 
its beginnings with the dawn of the Space Age in the late 1950s/early 1960s, when it 
first became possible to place cameras in polar earth orbit to remotely photograph any 
point on the globe on a routine and predictable basis.  Among the first applications for 
satellite-based imagery collection was for military intelligence information gathering or 
“reconnaissance” purposes.  US Government reporting, now declassified (although 
formerly highly classified), provides a wealth of information on the utility and value (and 
limitations) that such a remote sensing capability could have, particularly with respect to 
verification and monitoring beginning with the US CORONA Program when “Satellite 
imagery became the mainstay of the US arms-control verification process.” 11  The 
classified cameras systems steadily and dramatically improved with time in terms of 
spatial resolution (the smallest adjacent ground features that can be distinguished as 
separate entities) from the initial 12 meters down to 1.5 meters for the CORONA 
systems when that program ended in 1972, to better than 61 centimeters with the 
Keyhole (KH)-7 and -8 systems that were operated into the 1980s12 (see Figure 1). 
The CORONA program analytical reporting shows that, even with panchromatic 
imagery from non-digital/analog (photographic film-based) cameras, which provided 
resolutions (ground sample distance, or GSD) of 1.5 meters resolution or lesser 
quality13, it was possible for “photo-interpreters” using micro-stereoscopes and light 
tables to discern and convey important treaty verification relevant information. The 
finished reporting often required significant use of artistic perspective drawings 14  or 
hand-built 3D models to assist policy makers to more effectively visualize the key 
aspects of those findings.15(See Figure 2)  
 
Figure 1: A declassified Keyhole exemplar satellite image of the Lop Nur nuclear test site in China 
acquired on December 8, 1966 by a KH-7 satellite as shown display in the inset.  Sources: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB186/index.htm (inset: U.S.A.F. from  
http://www.space.com/12997-photos-declassified-spy-satellite-pictures.html) 
Nuclear Test Shot Tower 
at the Lop Nur Nuclear 
Test Site, China, December 8, 1966
KH-7 Mission unknown
KH-7 satellite on display 
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Among the declassified reporting were documents containing detailed descriptions 
of long-range ballistic missile deployments, nuclear weapons storage sites, uranium 
mines, nuclear test sites, and submarine bases.16  With respect to the use of satellite 
imagery for nuclear facilities from a treaty monitoring and verification perspective, a CIA 
Studies in Intelligence article specified,  
 
 
“Overhead imagery enabled the detection and analysis of critical 
elements of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure…Because of denial and 
deception counter-measures, however, the USSR’s nuclear program was 
an exceptionally hard target. The lack of reliable on-the-ground 
intelligence made it difficult for the West to understand important 
developments inside the Soviet nuclear complex, which resulted in 
significant intelligence gaps.”17  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cold war imagery analysis derived new satellite imagery-sourced information and then 
visualized the findings in maps, perspective drawings and hand-built 3D models of infrastructure.  
The upper left is a US “photo interpreter” (imagery analyst) using a stereomicroscope to view film 
positive imagery on a light table. The lower left image is a 1959 plot plan of the uranium ore 
concentration plant at Pyatigorsk in the former Soviet Union derived from US overhead imagery (in 
this case, U-2 aircraft imagery), and the upper right hand image is an artist’s 3D perspective 
drawing of the same facility.  The lower right hand image (video freeze-frame) shows a physical, 
hand built, 3D model of a submarine production facility in the former Soviet Union.  The intent was 
to help policy and decision makers more readily visualize what the imagery analysts were 
observing and discerning. Sources: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB186/doc01.pdf and 
http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/GAMHEX/Videos/1.mov and 
http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/GAMHEX/GAMBIT/17.PDF  
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Princeton University researcher, Hui Zhang, compiled a number of declassified 
satellite images of nuclear materials production facilities at roughly 1.8 meters 
resolution in his historical review of the utility of that imagery for treaty verification.  He 
showed how even at that resolution it was possible to identify major nuclear fuel cycle 
related facilities and monitor their operational status.18 To sum up the significance of the 
role of satellite imagery for verification applications, David Sandalow (then Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs with the U.S. 
Department of State) succinctly stated that,  
 
“These remote-sensing capabilities provided an important element 
of stability to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. Satellite information became, and remains today, an 
important tool for verification of arms control and non-proliferation 
treaties.”19   
2.1 Landsat Heralded the New Era of Open-Source Satellite 
Imagery  
In the unclassified “open source” realm, the US Government’s civilian Landsat 
system (that began in 1972) provided the first publicly accessible imagery from space, 
and would also serve as segue for true commercial satellite imagery that was yet to 
come.  The Landsat-1 satellite carried digital scanning sensors covering four 
multispectral bands that provided a spatial resolution of 80 meters (the smallest object 
that could be discriminated from another would be roughly 80 meters square).  Landsat-
1 imagery provided beautiful synoptic color (multispectral) composite global coverage (in 
squares 185 by 185 kilometers, or 34,000 square kilometers per frame), but had very 
limited utility for verification and monitoring applications.  Nonetheless, a declassified 
1975 CIA report did speculate that foreign governments could still find that imagery 
useful to “identify and target large cities, airports, port facilities, and transportation 
routes” and also “could be used to map and target even smaller features, such as larger 
Soviet SAM sites and soft ICBM sites,”but not for “targeting hard Soviet ICBM sites.”20  
The spatial resolution did not improve until 1984, when Landsat 5 was launched, which 
included the addition of the seven-spectral band scanner, 30 meter resolution Thematic 
Mapper (TM) camera system.21 Landsat 7, Launched in 1999, and Landsat 8, launched in 
early 2013, in addition to having eight-multispectral 30 meter bands, and two thermal 
100 meter infrared bands, also has a 15 meter resolution panchromatic (“black and 
white”) band used to “sharpen” the lower resolution multispectral band imagery.22  
 
 The first dramatic change occurred in early 1986, with the launch of the 20-
meter multispectral and 10-meter panchromatic ground resolution digital camera 
carrying French SPOT-1 (Système Pour l’Observation de la Terre) satellite.  SPOT-1 was 
the first commercial imaging satellite with sufficient resolution to have the potential for 
verification applications (albeit still quite limited). The potential of remote sensing for 
open-source verification (and for foreign policy applications) was most clearly first 
demonstrated in the aftermath of the Chernobyl reactor disaster in Ukraine in April 
1986.23   Images from the SPOT-1 satellite were combined with those the improved 
Landsat-5 to provide the first example of open-source multi-satellite, multi-sensor, 
synergy for nuclear related verification applications.24 Pioneer researchers soon began to 
envision how commercial satellite imagery could be applied to arms control and treaty 
verification to enhance international security.25  Their findings have, for the most part, 
since been proven to be quite prescient. 
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2.2 Envisioning the Future in 1990 
 
By early 1990, those researchers correctly expected that commercial satellite imagery 
would: 
1) provide benefits to the international community by raising the salience of 
arms control issues to the public consciousness, 
2) provide the necessary capability to support cross-border conflict 
monitoring, multi-lateral peacekeeping, crisis-decision making, and treaty 
verification and monitoring, and 
3) facilitate competition for, and some loss of credibility of, official national 
intelligence reporting. 
4) create new arguments about quality, cost , timeliness, censorship and 
shutter control. 
5) lead to implementation of countermeasures in the form of camouflage 
concealment and deception by various nations and even corporate entities. 
6) increase dramatically in availability with the number of satellites and the 
countries launching them, and that the ground resolution would improve. 
7) cause mistakes to happen as the result of erroneous interpretations, 
particularly by inadequately trained imagery analysts or neophytes. 
 
Among the expectations that were either overestimated or underestimated included 
that: 
1) The researchers envisioned the creation of both an International Satellite 
Monitoring Agency (ISMA, to follow up on a French proposal in 197826) and 
a MediaSat satellite exclusive for news media purposes27, neither of which 
became reality (although the IAEA’s Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit28, the 
European Union Satellite Centre29, and UNOSAT30 could certainly be 
viewed as positive steps towards an ISMA) 
2) The resolution of commercial satellite imagery would not become available 
below one meter resolution.  
3) Imagery costs would be prohibitive for all but a select few (the researchers 
never imagined cost-free imagery to NGOs or the creation of digital virtual 
globes like Google Earth, etc., that have now been downloaded over 1.2 
billion times.) 
4) Commercial satellites would create cadres of competing imagery analysts 
vying for air time on television networks, and would be as common as TV 
weather forecasters. (clearly, this has not yet occurred) 
5) The researchers never envisioned FTP data transfer rates, Wi-Fi, or the 
possibility of viewing high resolution imagery of practically any spot on 
earth with only a smart phone (which did not even exist at the time). 
 
Among the researcher’s key conclusions on the future of commercial satellite 
imagery: 
1) Superpowers (or any other national government or agency) will no longer 
“control the narrative”. Commercial satellite imagery would provide 
democratizing access to information otherwise previously unobtainable to 
the common man. 
2) Commercial satellite imagery will be a double-edged sword. It will have 
both beneficial and malign applications, but on balance the potential for 
good would far outweigh the potential for evil. 
3) Imagery does not come with labels.  The researchers knew that it would 
require competent interpretation to have added value, and moreover, 
mistakes could and would be made, such that corroboration by other 
sources would always be a requirement.  
4) Cost and timeliness would continue be a major concern. 
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Although the technology to provide commercial satellite imagery with a spatial 
resolution of less than two meters was deemed feasible, it was considered by most 
analysts at the time to be unlikely and would be unacceptable from both US government 
legal and policy perspectives.  
 
The 1990s did see some steady improvements in resolution, beginning with the 
addition of the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites, which provided the first sub-ten 
meter commercial satellite imagery. In 1994, IRS-1C could acquire 5.8 meter 
resolution panchromatic digital imagery. 1995 marked the advent of commercial 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery, with the Canadian RADARSAT providing 
resolution as fine as ten meters.  In 1998, the Russians also began to market what 
they promoted as 2 meter panchromatic imagery derived (scanned) from previously 
classified Russian satellite analog film based systems (although the quality seemed 
somewhat dubious).31 Equipped with those capabilities, it had already become possible 
for researchers to correctly locate and characterize the reactor site in Algeria32 and the 
nuclear test sites of both India and Pakistan when cued by other open-source 
information.33 
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3. Today’s Reality: The Previously Unanticipated 
 
In 1990, no one had correctly imagined what would be the full impact of 
constantly improving spatial, spectral, and temporal resolutions, and the timeliness of 
delivery due to improving information technologies, combined with the near ubiquity of 
commercial satellites imaging from low earth orbits. By the late 1990s, however, some 
researchers had begun to get a clearer vision of the resultant transparency and the 
impact on society that commercial satellite imagery was about to bring.  
 
“The constant flow of imagery about to start up will be much more: a rich, 
textured portrait, endlessly evolving. With shared eyes we will watch the world carry 
its cargo of civilization—its roads, its fields, its cities, its landfills—through time and 
space. This portrait will be an image that can zoom in to the personal and pull out to 
the geopolitical, a new way to look at borders, a new way to look at news. It will be 
an illustration of everything: not, in the end, a view from nowhere, but a view from 
everywhere, for everyone.”34  
 
“Public availability of timely high-resolution imagery represents a notable 
break with the past. We are moving from an era in which only a handful of 
governments had access to high-resolution imagery to one in which every 
government—and businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and terrorist and 
criminal groups—will have such access. Nonstate actors will be able to peer behind 
the walls of national sovereignty, accelerating a shift in power that is already under 
way.”35 
 
3.1 The Number of Satellites and Their Capabilities Are Increasing 
 
The number and variety of commercial imaging satellites that provide high 
resolution imagery sufficient for monitoring and verification applications continues to 
grow. In early 2000, there was only one commercial imaging satellite, Ikonos, capable of 
providing electro-optical imagery at a resolution of less than two meters, see Figure 
3.36   
As of this writing, there are currently nearly 30 earth orbiting commercial imaging 
satellites/systems with electro-optical spatial resolutions of two meters or better (See 
Figure 4), with the sharpest imagery currently available, via WorldView-3, at ~31 
centimeters (cm). 
 
Although there has been a substantial consolidation of the US commercial 
satellite imagery industry in the US over the past few years (DigitalGlobe merged with 
GeoEye, which itself had earlier merged with Orbimage), there has also been a period of 
greater market segmentation with new imagery capabilities beginning to fill distinct 
market niches that may serendipitously potentially benefit open source nonproliferation 
analysts. New constellations of “refrigerator-sized” “small sats” and “shoebox-sized” 
“nano-sats” are now providing commercial satellite imagery with complimentary 
capabilities of those provided by the larger vendors such as DigitalGlobe and Airbus 
Industries.37   
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Figure 3: Benchmarks for increasingly fine resolution of commercial satellite imaging systems 
over time.  
 
One US startup company, SkyBox (recently acquired by Google38) is operating 
two “small sats”, known as SkySats 1 & 2,39 by which it is acquiring ~90 cm resolution 
panchromatic and multi-spectral imagery, providing new opportunities to augment data 
from existing higher (finer) resolution imaging constellations (Figure 9 provides one 
exemplar).40 SkyBox intends to offer multiple images by multiple satellites of any point 
on Earth at several different times per day (or night) when tasked, eventually having as 
many as 24 satellites in its constellation. 41  Previous acquisition time windows had 
generally been limited to around 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. local time (although DigitalGlobe’s 
WorldView-3 acquires imagery at around 1:30 p.m. local time).42  
 
The SkySat satellites can also acquire High Definition (HD) videos, utilizing 
sensors that can even collect imagery at night. Among the many unique attributes of the 
SkyBox imaging system is that it does not use line scanners, but sensors similar to those 
used on smart phone cameras that also allow for video stream capture.43  
 
Urthecast, now based in Canada, which began by operating cameras on the 
International Space Station (ISS), is now in the process of creating its own free-flying 
satellite constellation of 16 satellites that is expected to provide frequent EO and EO 
video at ~50 cm, with near coincident radar imagery.44  
 
Planet Labs another recent startup company has already placed 101 “nano-sats” 
into orbit, which although limited to three meters resolution, will be able to image the 
entire planet in one day, every day.45 The constellation will effectively provide, as the 
company claims, “a line scanner for the planet.”46 In 2015, Planet Labs acquired another 
satellite company, Blackbridge, which operates a five satellite constellation of five 
meter resolution EO “RapidEye” satellites formerly operated by the German firm 
RapidEye AG. Companies like the British Surrey Satellite Technology (SST) LTD, which 
built the RapidEye satellites, are now providing one meter resolution mini-satellite 
imaging capabilities for purchase on a turnkey basis. Three SST DMC-3 “mini-satellites” 
were successfully launched in 201547 and are currently being leased by the Beijing-based 
company, 21AT. 
 
BlackSky Global, another US startup satellite imaging company, plans to deploy 
six one meter resolution imaging satellites in 2016 and have a full 60-satellite imaging 
constellation of by 2019, bringing “satellite imaging as a service.” 48  The Canadian 
startup firm, NorStar Space Data Inc., intends to launch a constellation of 40 imaging 
satellites of as yet unspecified resolution to “enable predictive analytics to meet global 
challenges.” 49  In 2013, the Argentinian firm, Satellogic, launched two nano-sats 
(CubeBugs 1 & 2) as prototypes of a future constellation intended “to image any spot on 
earth every few minutes,” but specifics on resolution have yet been provided.50 
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Figure 4: Commercial Satellites with Electro-Optical sensors having Ground Sample Distances 
(GSDs) of two meters or less in 2015. In early 2000, there was only one satellite with that 
capability. This is an original JRC graphic based on Internet-sourced images.  
 
Such diversity will also provide greater access to what might otherwise be denied 
areas with some vendors, and also ensure the integrity and validity of the data obtained 
for the historical record. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Freeze-frame from Google/SkyBox night-time High Definition video over Las Vegas.  In 
the original video, it is possible to see headlights of moving vehicles along the roads. Source: 
https://vimeo.com/112088357  
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For ESARDA Safeguards Training Course, JRC, March 26, 2015
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3.2 Temporal Resolution and Revisit Time Improvements: 
Observing Activity 
 
With such a large number of commercial imaging satellites and sensors orbiting 
the earth at one time, which one senior US Government official termed an “explosion of 
small satellites”,51 the previous concerns, regarding temporal resolution and timeliness 
of revisit, will no longer be an impediment with regard to verification applications. That 
rapid revisit capability provides what is in effect never before possible “persistent 
surveillance” on a global scale.  
 
Commercial satellite coverage of the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters shows 
how much has already changed in the past quarter century.  For Chernobyl, commercial 
satellite images of 10 to 30 meters resolution were taken days apart.52  In monitoring 
Fukishima, DigitalGlobe not only acquired two ~50 cm images of the Fukishima reactor 
site on the same day (March 14, 2011, using two different satellites in its constellation), 
but those images were acquired one minute before, and only three minutes after, 
the building housing Reactor Unit 3 exploded.53 
 
Another exemplar showing the timeliness, responsiveness, and global 
coordination that is now possible from the commercial satellite imaging community 
involves the attempt to locate and rescue two lost hikers in the Andes Mountains. 
TomNod (Mongolian for “Big Eye”), sought and obtained commercial satellite imagery 
from DigitalGlobe, and within hours engaged nearly 800 globally-linked volunteers in the 
search. The imagery was not only made available within two days, but was of sufficient 
resolution (~50 cm) to see the lost and doomed hikers’ footprint tracks in the snow.54 
 
The introduction of video capabilities offers new advantages over still images in 
that it can allow more recognizable observation of plant operation signatures (rising 
cooling tower plumes) and other activity (vehicular and construction equipment 
movement) at sites of monitoring and verification interest. The SkySat satellites can also 
acquire High Definition (HD) videos 55 , with durations of up to 90 seconds, utilizing 
~1.1meters resolution sensors capable of nighttime imagery (in one example, 
automobile headlights can be observed moving down the streets of Las Vegas, Nevada, 
see Figure 556). Urthecast’s one meter resolution imager located on the ISS can also 
acquire 60 second long Ultra-High Definition (UHD) videos, over any location that the 
space station orbits. This shortening time gap capability is bringing us ever closer to the 
asymptote of “persistent surveillance” on a global scale. Though varying in resolution 
from coarse to fine, “the types of spacecraft being developed by providers such as Sky-
box, UrtheCast, and Planet Labs are intended to “darken” 57 the skies with sensors. Their 
advantage is the ability to revisit a target multiple times a day, offering more intelligence 
on the patterns of life and activities taking place there.”58 The more frequently any point 
on the globe is imaged (or videoed), the more difficult it becomes to conceal illicit 
operations. The resulting high repetitive revisit rate (from the sum of all the existing and 
planned EO systems) will also make it much easier to detect changes associated with the 
construction of larger features like roads and major buildings of potential relevance to 
monitoring and verification for nonproliferation applications. It is also becoming easier to 
detect such changes in an automated way using feature extraction tools (e.g., advanced 
machine learning algorithms) that are also currently under development.59 
 
One other aspect of this new era of observation satellites that should not be 
overlooked is that they are increasingly agile, providing another way to reduce the time 
gap between two image captures. Figure 6 shows how the same point was imaged 
three times on a single pass by the Airbus Industries’ Pléiades 1B, ~50 cm resolution, 
commercial imaging satellite. While each image is still just a snapshot in time, the gaps 
between each snapshot can be reduced, potentially capturing on-the-ground activity not 
otherwise possible. 
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Three pictures on the Mecca ”tower clock” acquired by Pléiades 1B every 90 
seconds in a single pass to see the minutes needle moving! 
(image credit: CNES)
https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/p/pleiades#foot33%29 & http://seso.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/building.png
Satellites are becoming more Agile: 
Multiple images are obtainable on a single pass!
1
2
3
1 2 3
For ESARDA Safeguards Training Course, JRC, March 26, 2015
Figure 6: Three pictures on the Mecca “tower clock” acquired by Pléiades 1B every 90 seconds in 
a single pass to see the minutes needle moving! (Image credit: Airbus Industries). This graphic 
was first published in Reference 8.   
https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/p/pleiades#foot33%29 
and http://seso.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/building.png 
3.3 Spatial Resolution Improvements: Seeing Greater Detail 
    
Among the most significant changes that have occurred since the beginning of 
the 21st Century was the public availability of one meter resolution commercial satellite 
imagery (the first one meter resolution images were provided by US commercial 
companies, allowed under a 1992 US federal law). Such high resolution marked the 
beginning of a new paradigm in global transparency and spawned two major publications 
surfaced at that time in recognition of that fact, one of which openly proclaimed in its 
title, “How Commercial Satellite Imagery Will Change the World.”   By 2008, 50 cm 
resolution imagery had become available via the GeoEye-1 satellite, and in 2014, 31 cm 
imagery first became available via the WorldView-3 satellite (a June 2014 change in US 
Federal law permitted US companies to sell satellite imagery with resolution as fine as 25 
cm ). Nine pixels at 30 cm is equivalent to the footprint of one pixel at 90 cm, which 
effectively represents a 900 percent improvement in image detail (resolution) from 15 
years ago.  
To more fully appreciate the significance of these improvements, it is worthwhile 
to view a few comparisons as shown in Figure 7 (adapted from DigitalGlobe promotional 
media60). What is particularly noteworthy is that it is possible to “identify automobiles as 
sedans or station wagons”, which was previously not possible with any other commercial 
satellite imagery.  According to the Civil National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale 
(NIIRS, a scale of zero through nine, with nine having the best interpretability61), such 
specific criteria qualifies the 30 centimeter resolution imagery posted by DigitalGlobe as 
being NIIRS 6.0.  Interestingly enough, DigitalGlobe’s own corporate literature only 
claims a lower NIIRS rating of 5.7. 62  And even at the lesser rating, DigitalGlobe 
advertises (via that same promotional media) that the 30 centimeter resolution imagery 
from its WorldView-3 satellite “can resolve objects on the ground such as above-ground 
utility lines in a residential neighborhood, manhole covers, building vents, fire hydrants, 
and individual seams on locomotives.”63 This capability will lead to improved monitoring 
and verification of nuclear facilities (e.g., potentially allowing differentiation of different 
types of UF6 cylinders in open storage (see Figure 7), the identification of critical fuel 
cycle equipment either in transit or in open storage, or operational details associated 
with electrical power conditioning, and heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) related 
equipment and infrastructure). 
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Figure 7: Interpretability comparison of high resolution commercial satellite imagery with 
differing resolutions below one meter. The top images are exclusively from commercial 
imaging satellites over Sao Paolo, Brazil; but each was acquired on a different day.64 The 
bottom images are of UF6 cylinders (lower right shows stiffening rings on large cylinders 
and eight small cylinders). This figure was first published in Reference 8. 
3.4 Spectral Resolution Improvements: Seeing Beyond the Visible  
 
To da , commercial satellite imagery being utilized for open-source 
nonproliferation and potential treaty verification applications has primarily involved 
electro-optical (EO) multi-spectral bands in the visible and near-infrared combined to 
create panchromatic sharpened naturally appearing color imagery.  While not addressing 
all the implications of applying other commercial satellite-based sensor suites to promote 
additional synergies (that are not possible using only electro-optical (EO) visible 
spectrum imagery alone), it is important to at least be aware of their complementary 
strengths as each sensor adds a new perspective are also evolving with improving 
resolutions. 
 
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery, with resolutions now available down to 
~25 cm,65 is not only useful in all weather, for all hours, day or night, monitoring of 
activity, but it is particularly helpful in detecting security perimeters that might otherwise 
be obscured by vegetation. Hyperspectral imagery sensors (as are currently available on 
the US Hyperion satellite66, the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Proba-1 satellite67, and 
soon to be on the German EnMap satellite 68 ) is derived from data covering up to 
hundreds of bands (at resolutions of between 17 and 34 meters) and provides the 
capability to identify materials, e.g., uranium ore (vice copper or iron ore) at a suspect 
ore processing facility. 69   DigitalGlobe’s newest WorldView-3 satellite, advertised as 
“super-spectral” with 29-bands (including panchromatic 0.31 meter at Nadir and 
multispectral 1.24 meter at Nadir), may provide similar unique insights.  The additional 
new 3.7 meter resolution shortwave infrared (SWIR) capability makes it possible to see 
through thick haze and smoke (see Figure 8).70  Such a capability might be requisite for 
detecting some critical equipment movement of verification relevance not otherwise 
apparent by alternative remote-sensing means. 71  Thermal infrared satellite imagers, 
even with resolutions as coarse as 100 meters, can potentially provide unique 
operational information when combined with other geospatial information (see exemplar 
case in Figure 11. ).  
 
Perhaps the most important development However, one new development in the 
field of satellite-based thermal imaging is that Korean operated satellite, KOMPSAT-3A, 
was successfully launched in March 2015 and is now operational. The KOMPSAT-3A has a 
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5.5 meter resolution mid-wavelength infrared (MWIR) thermal imaging sensor, 
operating in the 3.3-5.2 micron range, with a coincident capacity for acquiring a 55 cm 
EO imagery for cross-correlation. 72  Most significantly, KOMPSAT-3A now provides 
significantly finer resolution thermal imagery than both Landsat and ASTER, and that 
imagery can be also acquired at night.  To what degree KARI’s TIR imagery can be 
utilized for nonproliferation monitoring and verification has yet to be proven, but it is 
expected that it will provide the capability to readily detect warm water effluents and 
much more precisely locate “hotspots” (like the cooling unit example in Figure 11) 
arising from operations at a variety of nuclear-related facilities.73 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Short Wave Infrared (SWIR) enables 
viewing through the dense smoke of an active 
fire to the ground beneath, as well as locating 
the flame front and hot spots in the fire. This is 
a WorldView-3 image of a forest fire burning at 
the Happy Camp complex in California’s Klamath 
National Forest in August 2014.  The upper 
image is what is only discernable in the visible 
part of the spectrum. The smoke completely 
obscures the ground. The lower image is of the 
exact same area as viewed with SWIR imagery: 
the smoke disappears, and the hot spots in the 
fire become clearly visible. The SWIR image is a 
“false color” composite made from three of the 
eight SWIR bands (bands 6, 3, and 1) that 
coincidentally give an orange color to the fires.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.digitalglobeblog.com/2014/09/03/revealing-the-hidden-world-with-
shortwave-infrared-swir-imagery/   
 
3.5 Improvements in Accessibility and Pricing 
 
Another unexpected development was how even the most prescient researchers 
fell short of what is now commonplace with respect to how huge volumes of commercial 
satellite imagery are now accessible cost-free by anyone via the Internet.  Virtual Globes 
(AKA Digital Earths), like Google Earth, Here, Bing Maps, Esri ArcGIS, etc., provide the 
capability to synoptically view multi-resolution, three-dimensional, virtual 
representations of the earth and created a new venue to “navigate through space and 
time” with high resolution imagery (including from commercial space-based satellite 
remote sensing systems). 74   In 2015, Google Earth Pro (previously priced at $399) 
became freely downloadable.  It offers the additional key benefits (not previously 
available with the original free version) of allowing area measurements for facility size 
determinations; video movie-making of fly-throughs for pre-inspection familiarization, 
etc.; and the capability to create “view-sheds” to highlight all areas within a given line of 
sight to assess ground level masking, etc.75 
 
Accessing supplemental imagery and purchasing it has also become easier. 
Searching the multitude of available imaging archives of the increasingly diverse vendor 
options would have been a daunting task if not for the creation of web-based 
Image © 2015 DigitalGlobe. 
Image © 2015 DigitalGlobe, Inc. 
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applications such as Apollo Mapping’s Image Hunter76 or GeoCento’s Earth Images77, 
which provide quick agnostic access to multiple image archives of different vendors from 
different countries. However, as of this writing, there is still not a complete “one-stop-
shop” for all vendors of commercial satellite imagery, but may emerge if present trends 
continue. (And even thumbnail versions of archived images can supply new useful 
information, as is exemplified in the upper right inset of Figure 10.) 
 
The price of both acquisition and processing of imagery, which had been another 
major concern in the 1990s and early 2000s (in that individual frames of archived 
imagery originally cost about $3000-4000 a frame), has, in some but not all cases, 
dropped substantially such that archived imagery from DigitalGlobe (for example) can 
cost as little as $350 for a 25 square kilometer area, or around $500 for a similar area 
special order request. Competition between the United States, France, India, Russia, 
Canada, China, Israel, Japan, South Korea, etc., will likely continue to put downward 
pressure on prices, making commercial satellite imagery even more affordable from 
more diverse sources. 78  Perhaps, the most astounding development came with the 
development of an iPhone app that makes possible the purchase of a one kilometer 
square area of some archived commercial satellite imagery from a multi-corporate 
international satellite constellation of up to 26 satellites for as little as $10. 79  (see 
Figure 10) In April 2015, the ESA began providing SPOT and Pléiades data for free for 
research and application development through project proposals submitted via ESA's 
Earth Online Portal.80  
 
Moreover, subsequent to a purchase, it is already possible to do on-the-spot 
analyses of such imagery using only that same smart phone, or as one recent blogger 
noted, “Imagery analysis by iPhone. Neither Bud Wheelon nor Steve Jobs could have 
predicted this.”81 
 
Neither did anyone expect to ever see commercial satellite imagery being 
provided at little or no direct cost as found on the various virtual globes like Google 
Earth, Here, Bing Maps, Apple Maps, and ArcGIS My Map, etc. (See Appendix A), which 
are also viewable on smart phones today (albeit without all the functionality available on 
a computer).  Interestingly, when Google Earth first came on the scene in 2005, one 
common complaint was that the imagery was often too old and out of date (or more 
recently, that did not represent “a perfect planetary mirror”82), with the implication that 
separate imagery purchases would always be necessary for temporal currency. However, 
in some cases, particularly in those areas of high media interest, including nuclear 
facilities in Iran and North Korea, the imagery can be quite current.  For example, at the 
North Korea’s Punggye nuclear test site there are eight different archived high-resolution 
commercial satellite images acquired between the January 1, 2013 and February 12, 
2013, the date of the third identified underground nuclear test. Google Earth’s historical 
layer view permits visual inspection of each of those images in that archive.  
 
With respect to hardware and software expenses, those costs have also dropped 
dramatically, and the large file sizes associated with such imagery are also much easier 
to transfer, process, and store than ever before.  Storage and processing in the cloud via 
open open-source frameworks like Apache Hadoop, which allows the storage and 
processing of big data in a distributed environment across clusters of computers using 
simple programming models, now empowers anyone, anywhere with unimagined, 
effectively cost-free computing power. Hadoop is designed to scale up from single 
servers to thousands of machines, each offering local computation and storage.83 The 
mere fact that Google Earth and other commercial satellite and aerial imagery based 
maps are accessible via smart phones and other hand held devices (tablets), using either 
a cell-phone connection or WI-FI, shows how readily accessible commercial satellite 
imagery has become. 
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4. The Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery for 
Creating Innovation in Verification Applications 
 The IAEA has already proven the utility of commercial satellite imagery to assist 
the IAEA in monitoring nuclear fuel cycle facilities and activities, but to also investigate 
possible undeclared activities. 84  The improved availability and access of commercial 
satellite imagery, together with the means to visualize it in a 3D geospatial context, has 
made possible a host of similar investigations by others, including NGOs, academics and 
hobbyists, that have resulted in somewhat surprising discoveries.  Those discoveries 
were made in what would be otherwise “denied environments”; and which would have 
been impossible for anyone not previously having the resources of at least a super-
power nation state.85 
4.1 Exemplar Verification Successes with Commercial Satellite 
Imagery  
 
 Since the turn of the century and the advent of sub-one meter resolution 
commercial satellite imagery, there have been numerous examples of how such imagery 
can successfully be used to verify allegations concerning clandestine nuclear and missile 
related facilities and activities, and any significant changes associated with them.  The 
identification and characterization of the Iranian underground uranium enrichment plant 
at Natanz in 2002, followed by similar investigative work by NGO analysts at the 
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), was trailblazing.86  Since then, 
the frequency of such discoveries and their subsequent reporting has increased in 
keeping with the increased frequency of imagery coverage around the world, particularly 
those of high interest. The renovation and “refurbishment” * activity at the Iranian high 
explosives test facility at Parchin, allegedly part of an effort to cover-up previous nuclear 
weapons related activity was characterized and closely monitored by ISIS and others 
using multiple commercial satellite images over time.87  Those reports were filed on both 
the ISIS website and Arms Control Wonk blog.  
  
But not every open-source lead has had merit, as ISIS recently demonstrated in 
early 2013 when it also provided evidence that an alleged explosion at the Iranian 
underground uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (near Qom) could not be 
substantiated with imagery acquired the very day after the alleged event. 88   Other 
notable discoveries were made by Nick Hansen on behalf of IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, 
using commercial satellite imagery of the Iranian missile and space launch complex at 
Semnan, Iran. He was able to detect evidence of failed space launches of the Fajr 
satellite in May 2012, and again more dramatically in late September 2012 (a major 
explosion had occurred on the pad) that went entirely unreported by the Iranian 
Government, the Iranian media, and the international media.89 
4.2 Multi-Satellite/Multi-Sensor Synergy 
This section highlights the utility of combining information from multiple electro-
optical satellites (e.g., each having different resolutions) or multiple satellites having 
different sensors suites (e.g., high resolution optical imagery with synthetic aperture 
radar imagery or thermal infrared imagery). With each combination, sometimes referred 
to as “multi-sensor data fusion,”90 it is possible to derive a unique synergy, such that the 
whole of the information that can be gleaned from the combination is really greater than 
the simple sum of the information from the multiple images if each were to be analyzed 
in the absence of the others.  However, for the purposes of this study, data fusion 
incorporates all sources of information not just sensor data. Four exemplars are below. 
                                           
* IAEA Director General visited the site in late 2015 and noted the refurbishment from the inside. 
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1) The first example was derived when observing activity at the Punggye nuclear 
test site in North Korea.  On May 1, 2014, two images were acquired of that test site 
such that the first image, a 50 centimeter resolution electro-optical image acquired by 
DigitalGlobe was augmented by a 90 centimeter resolution electro-optical image 
acquired by SkyBox of the test site that was acquired only 59 minutes later (See Figure 
9).   
Figure 9: Multi-satellite coverage can provide synergy by allowing us to derive dark-toned vehicle 
movement between two nuclear test portal areas within one hour using different satellites from 
different vendors (left ~50 cm resolution image from DigitalGlobe, right 90 cm resolution from 
Skybox imaging) that is suggestive of an official visit/inspection to each of the two active test 
tunnels within an hour of each other. 
The ~50 cm image from DigitalGlobe (as found on Google Earth, Figure 9, top 
left) shows a multi-vehicle entourage involving two black sedans or SUVs (and two 
possible escort vehicles) near the South Portal, but not at the West Portal (Figure 9, 
top right), which is separated from the South Portal by about one kilometer.  Although 
the subsequent ~90 cm SkyBox imagery (Figure 9, bottom left) showed that the 
previous four vehicle entourage was no longer present at the South Portal (Figure 9, 
bottom right), that imagery did reveal that two dark-toned vehicles (albeit fuzzier due 
to the lower resolution) had arrived near the West Portal.)  
 
2) The second exemplar (see Figure 10) shows how, through the use of multiple 
EO images from multiple commercial satellites provided free by Google Earth (along with 
a separately purchased image at low-cost) it was possible to newly locate, identify, and 
characterize a possible nuclear waste site by simply following-up on a single report from 
Iranian news.91 
 
In late 2014, Iranian news reported that the, “Chief of the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi paid a visit to a long-term nuclear waste 
storage facility in the central province of Isfahan. Salehi visited the city of Anarak…to get 
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update on the latest developments regarding the construction of the nuclear waste 
stabilization and storage facility.”92 A rapid and relatively easy search of the area around 
the town of Anarak, Iran (using the most recent imagery available from Google Earth: 
July 16, 2013, Figure 10, large bottom image), made possible the location of a 
candidate site.  A subsequent review of DigitalGlobe imagery archives (Figure 10, top 
left) revealed multiple acquisitions centered on that same site, indicating that this site 
first began attracting continuing interest by others (NFI) in early 2014 (although Google 
Earth shows that construction at the site was first underway by October 2011). The two 
most recent images (Figure 10, top right, from March 13, 2015 and May 17, 2015) are 
viewable for free directly from those archives (albeit at reduced resolution). Even at the 
reduced resolutions, they are sufficient to show continued construction and changes 
onsite, e.g., like the addition of a new blue roof to a small building in close proximity to 
the largest building onsite. The overall site, which is served by a newly paved access 
road and an outer entrance facility (Figure 10, top right), exhibits the requisite 
features for a secure storage vault-type radwaste structure situated in dry, stable, 
geology that is also not susceptible to flash flooding. 
 
3) The third example illustrates how multi-sensor synergy can clearly have 
nonproliferation verification relevance.  Figure 11 is derived from a 90 centimeter 
resolution Skybox electo-optical image of the North Korean Yongbyon gas centrifuge 
uranium enrichment facility, which was overlain (by Niko Milonopoulos93) with a much 
lower resolution (100 meter resolution resampled to 30 meters94 ) thermal infrared 
(TIR) image acquired by Landsat in September 2014.95   
 
That co-registration indicated:  
 
1)   an apparent “hot spot” located at the northwest corner of the uranium enrichment 
facility;  
2) in general, the entire centrifuge facility was generally warmer that the surrounding  
background. 
 
Armed with that information, closer inspection of electro-optical imagery from 
different satellites having resolutions varying from 50 centimeters to one meter (as 
provided at no cost via Google Earth via its historical layer) revealed that there are: 1) 
two banks of three small cooling units located in that precise area of that “hot spot”; and 
2) that there is one bank of three small cooling units associated with each of the twin 
cascade halls (each having ~2000 gas centrifuges96). Moreover, DigitalGlobe electro-
optical imagery from mid-January 2014 (also available via Google Earth) revealed bright 
white deposits in close proximity to both banks of cooling towers, which, given the time 
of year and the presence of frozen water elsewhere on the image, suggests that flash 
frozen cooling water vapor was the source of those deposits. As a result, we have been 
provided a new signature for determining that both banks of cooling towers were 
operating as early as January 2014. Such information would not necessarily have been 
derived from any of these images they had been only viewed in isolation. 
 
Particularly noteworthy is that Landsat imagery (including the thermal bands 
employed above) is continually being updated on a daily basis.97  Moreover, all of the 
earlier acquired imagery, dating back to 1972 is available from archives that are readily 
accessible by anyone using the free online software application, “Google Earth Engine.”98  
Until quite recently, the only publicly available TIR imagery was via Landsat 99  and 
ASTER. 100  Interestingly, the Multispectral Thermal Imager (MTI) satellite, which was 
specifically designed to develop and evaluate advanced space-based technology for 
nonproliferation treaty monitoring and other national security and civilian applications 
(including an unspecified resolution thermal imagery capability within a 15-band sensor 
array), is not providing data that is available to the public at this time.101 
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Figure 10: In following-up on one news report (see quote in inset), a possible “Nuclear Waste 
Stabilization and Storage Facility” nearing completion near Anarak, Iran could be identified.  
Having first located the candidate site on the most recent imagery available from Google Earth 
(July 16, 2013, large bottom image), a review of DigitalGlobe imagery archives (top left) revealed 
multiple acquisitions centered on that same site, indicating that this site first began attracting 
continuing interest by others in early 2014 (although Google Earth shows that construction at the 
site was first underway by October 2011). The most recent May 17, 2015 image (top right), which 
is viewable as a thumbnail for free directly from those archives (albeit at reduced resolution), is 
sufficient to see continued construction and changes from the last previous archived image from 
March 13, 2015. The site, which is also served by a newly paved access road and an outer 
entrance facility (top right), exhibits the requisite features for a secure storage vault-type 
radwaste structure situated in dry, stable, geology that is also not susceptible to flash flooding. 
Significantly, the April 16, 2014 inset photo (bottom left) was purchased via SpyMeSat for $10 and 
is more recent than that currently found on Google Earth.  This figure was first published in 
Reference 8. 
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Figure 11: This figure provides an example of multi-satellite, multi-sensor, synergy, for 
verification applications.  In this case, some operations at the North Korean gas centrifuge 
uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon can be monitored remotely.  The original cascade hall, 
consisting of ~2000 centrifuges, was visited by Dr. Siegfried Hecker in 2010.  In 2013, what 
appeared to be a duplicate cascade hall and probable expanded control room were constructed. 
The low resolution LANDSAT thermal imagery directed our analytical focus to an area where 
cooling towers were identified with higher (finer) resolution optical imagery.  While the lower 
(coarser) resolution thermal imagery could not distinguish whether one or both towers were 
operational in September 2014, the January 2014 DigitalGlobe finer resolution imagery (as is 
viewable with Google Earth) suggests that both were possibly operating as early as January 2014. 
This figure was first published in Reference 8. 
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4) The fourth and last example (See Figure 12) was published by the IAEA 
Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit (SIAU), and shows the utility of cross-correlation of 
electro-optical satellite imagery (in this case DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-1 panchromatic 
imagery on top) with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery from Airbus’s TerraSAR-X 
satellite (via Infoterra) on the bottom.  The key points to take away are that Radar 
imagery can provide cloud penetration for all weather and day or night observation and 
is highly sensitive to corner reflections of metallic anthropogenic objects such as vehicles 
and fence lines. Additional demonstrations of the utility of SAR imagery and its analysis 
specifically for electrical and power installations can be found at the TerrSAR-X IMINT 
Manual demo site available at http://tim.infoterra.de. 
 
 
Figure 12: This figure provides an example how the comparison of electro-optical imagery (top) 
with radar imagery (bottom) can provide multi-sensor information synergy. Perimeter fence lines 
are more pronounced in the radar image.  Also in the radar image, metal edges or railings on the 
tops of buildings create the bright reflections on the sides facing the incident radar beam (white 
arrow from right to left); while the opposite sides of the same structures are completely dark 
where the incident beam is blocked (creating discernable shadows, e.g., note the long linear 
shadow cast by the ventilation stack). Source: IAEA, see Reference 3. 
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5. The Role of Imagery Analysis 
Imagery analysis is critical to any pertinent verification information extraction 
from commercial satellite imagery, but it is one of the least appreciated aspects, if for no 
other reason than there is the common assumption that “anyone can look at pictures.” 
While that statement may be true, it is not true that anyone can be an imagery analyst 
who can derive new, value-added meaning from a satellite image.  Imagery analysis 
requires studied interpretation of the raw unannotated imagery, and Albert Einstein 
fittingly observed that, “information, however, is not knowledge. Raw data means 
nothing without interpretation.”102  
 
Imagery analysis is the cornerstone upon which all the imagery data collection 
technologies and processing capabilities are built upon. For nuclear nonproliferation 
verification applications, commercial satellite imagery (and the associated geospatial 
tools with which to view and assess it, together with collateral information from other 
sources) must be competently interpreted by well-trained and experienced imagery 
analysts who are fully cognizant of the nuclear fuel cycle and its infrastructure, 
equipment, and operations. Those imagery analysts must also have a good command of 
other open-source information technologies and be able to draw upon them correctly 
under the rubric of what has been termed “Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) tradecraft.” 
Title 10 U.S. Code §467 establishes the definition of GEOINT as meaning, “the 
exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and 
visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. 
GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.” GEOINT 
tradecraft has been defined as “unique and sometimes privileged organizational sources 
and methods for obtaining information of a place and making sense of the information to 
support the decision maker in understanding human activities and intentions. Methods 
comprise the technologic tools to organize geospatial data and the cognitive techniques 
used by the analyst to make sense of it when rendering judgments, insights, and 
forecasts.”103  
5.1 Imagery Analysis Defined  
 
Imagery analysis, as a subset of GEOINT, is the process by which to extract 
meaningful information from images, which, for this review, consist primarily of imagery 
obtained from low-earth-orbiting commercial imaging satellites. In a previous review, it 
was stated that commercial satellite imagery, as it is available for purchase today in its 
raw form, is nothing more than “a pile of pixels”.104 It is the job of the imagery analyst 
to derive meaning from those pixels. As one practitioner has pointed out, “Pixels are 
becoming a commodity, and the real value is in extracting that data, making it 
understandable, and making it useful to customers.”105 Imagery analysis is the means by 
which a body of pixels is holistically interpreted, and creatively combined, in light of 
other collateral open-source information (e.g., safeguards pertinent data) to 
synergistically derive new, “value-added,” information from the raw un-annotated 
imagery. That information can then be added to the overall existing body of 
nonproliferation knowledge with respect to a particular facility, activity, or program. 
Imagery analysis is critical to nonproliferation verification and monitoring, particularly as 
it applies to identifying possible clandestine “undeclared facilities and activities”. 
Commercial satellite imagery must be competently interpreted by well-trained and 
experienced imagery analysts who are fully cognizant of the nuclear fuel cycle and its 
infrastructure, equipment, and operations, and who are able to correctly distinguish 
those features from those that can be associated with other non-nuclear industrial 
processes.  
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5.2 Imagery Analysis is a Process  
Imagery analysis is a process that begins with an initial examination of an image 
and its constituent features. Among the constituent features of any image that will aid in 
interpretation and which can lead to identifications: 
 
 Size:  is the aspect representing both the true physical size, and relative scale, of 
objects in the image. (which can be directly measurable with mensuration tools such 
as the “ruler” tool in Google Earth) 
 Shape: is the physical appearance necessary for an object’s recognition and help in 
identification. “Anthropogenic” features are most often geometric, while “natural” 
features are almost always amorphous. 
 Shadows:  are silhouettes that provide unique insights of shape that might 
otherwise not be apparent without them.  (See an exemplar in Figure 13) 
 Shade: the brightness and contrast variations of one object compared to another. 
 Surroundings:  establish the physical setting and cultural context. What are the 
discernable associations that can be made with nearby objects in the broader view? 
 Signatures: are natural or anthropogenic features that either alone or in 
aggregation are distinguishing characteristics that can lead to an identification of an 
object on an image. Anthropogenic signatures are those generally consistent 
associated features of a facility or activity used to discriminate and identify the type 
of facility based on unique required functional or operational characteristics. For 
example, a coal-fired power plant can be readily distinguished from a nuclear power 
plant.  While both types of power plants will include generator halls, large cooling 
systems, electrical switchyards, and power lines; a coal fired power plant can be 
readily identified by the unique presence of expansive black coal piles adjacent to 
large conveyors for transporting coal the coal from the piles to the boiler (furnace).  
Moreover the coal fired power plants utilized smoke stacks vice ventilation stacks 
associated with nuclear power plants. Various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have 
some generally consistent signatures; (see an exemplar in Figure 14). Patterns, 
as another form of anthropogenic signatures, are distinctive, generally consistent 
and recurring spatial arrangement of features that are associated with certain 
groups of objects, e.g., linear arrayed fruit or nut trees in orchards, circular irrigated 
agricultural fields, cross-hatched street layouts in urban areas, or the “Star of David” 
layout of old Soviet-era SA-2 surface to air missile sites.106 “Signature Keys” have 
been created to assist in imagery interpretation of various industrial processes (see 
for example the National Imagery and Mapping Agency’s unclassified Photographic 
Interpretation Handbook published in 1996107). 
 Texture: is the apparent roughness or smoothness of features in an image, e.g., 
water bodies appear much smoother than surrounding terrain. 
 Time: is a factor manifested in temporal changes including construction history, 
activity levels, operations, etc. 
 Perspective: Commercial satellite imagery is most often acquired with a view that 
is most nearly straight down from above.  This is a view that is not normal for most 
human beings who are most familiar with horizontal terrestrial views.  A cylindrical 
water tank or reactor dome, when viewed straight down, can appear as a circle/disk 
(the reactor dome on the cover is one example).  So the imagery analyst must 
always realize that while any single image is only two dimensional, it must always be 
mentally processed in three dimensions. 
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Imagery Analysis: Shadows & Setting Exemplar
What is this?
(Without shadows, 
fairly easy)
What is this?
(Without shadows, 
fairly difficult)
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: “Shadows” are a critical element in the analysis of commercial satellite imagery. While 
the oblique view of the Washington Monument makes it relatively easy to identify without 
shadows, the near vertical view of the St. Louis Arch would be almost impossible to identify apart 
from its shadow. Adapted from (a no longer active link): 
https://www1.nga.mil/kids/geoint/imagery/Pages/Shadow.aspx        
 
The next step in the imagery analysis process is to begin to make 
mental/internalized visual connections. This is done by both direct inspection and by 
inferences based on the previously mentioned constituent features of the image being 
analyzed.  It also involves deductive reasoning such that the questions that are most 
commonly asked initially are 1) what? and 2) where?  Then, with further review and 
comparison over time through the use of change detection, the question that can then 
be answered is 3) when?  The final steps include seeking answers to 4) why?, 5) how?, 
and most importantly, 6) what is the significance? 
 
There are a number of other steps involved in this process.  The deductive (more 
precisely “abductive”108) reasoning or “sense making” of the extracted answers have to 
be viewed through a mental lens that can focus the disparate data elements into a 
cohesive narrative through “convergence of evidence” that leads to the "inference for the 
best explanation".  The old saying, “if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks 
like a duck…it is probably a duck,” generally holds true in most imagery analysis 
situations. But the next step is not to be lulled into complacency with any conclusions so 
derived. Unlike pure scientific research, by which conclusions are empirically derived by 
objective data, imagery analysis of commercial satellite imagery for verification purposes 
can involve potentially manipulated data courtesy of a potentially deceptive adversary.  
Camouflage, concealment, and deception (including signature suppression) are constant 
threats to correct image analysis. Because the imagery analysis process is dealing with 
remotely collected information that is processed at some level through human 
interpretation and is therefore not necessarily empirically derived, imagery analysis is as 
much art as science in that the conclusions are only approximations of truth and only 
hypotheses that must be tested through remote critique.  The hypotheses should be 
validated wherever possible with supporting collateral information, if any can be found.  
For verification and monitoring purposes, this is particularly difficult when evaluating 
clandestine “undeclared facilities and activities” and even more so when they are placed 
underground. 
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Figure 14: “Signatures” play a critical role in nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure analysis.  The top 
view provides a flow diagram of the key components in the operation of a uranium ore 
concentration plant.  The lower image is an operational uranium ore concentration plant, 
sometimes also referred to as a yellow cake production plant. Diagram source: 
http://www.nuclearweb.info/Uranium/Uranium_mill_news.html   
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Wherever possible, peer review should always be sought, but the imagery analyst 
should also always strive to be his or her own worst critic.  The final conclusions should 
also be weighted in terms of confidence level by the addition of caveats; e.g., “suspect” 
(low confidence), “possible” (medium confidence), “probable” (higher confidence, or the 
conclusion is the best of all assessed possibilities).  Without a caveat, any conclusion will 
be perceived by others to be no less than “certain”.  Imagery analysis, particularly when 
dealing with issues of verification should at least meet the same analytical rigor as that 
set forth in the US Intelligence Community Directive on Analytical Standards (no.203).109  
Invariably one can find much in the open literature that emphasizes information 
technology (IT), geographic information systems (GIS), “geomatics”, image processing, 
but almost nothing at all in relation to the human interpretation of imagery.110 However, 
in addition to the more generic Manual of Photographic Interpretation published by the 
American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing in 2006,111 there are a few 
insights from the military applications sector as aggregated and published by the 
Federation of American Scientists.112  
Another point to consider with regard to imagery analysis involves the personal 
attributes of the analyst who is engaged in imagery analysis.  John Jensen (2007) 
described factors that distinguish a superior image analyst. He said, "It is a fact that 
some image analysts are superior to other image analysts because they: 1) understand 
the scientific principles better, 2) are more widely traveled and have seen many 
landscape objects and geographic areas, and/or 3) they can synthesize scientific 
principles and real-world knowledge to reach logical and correct conclusions."113 This 
author would also add that years of experience and familiarity with the subject area from 
“on the ground” as well as from above will make the critical difference. 
Finally, in June 2000, David Sandalow provided this quote that is just as true 
today as it was at that time,  
 
“We should explore ways to help improve interpretation of satellite 
imagery. Imagery interpretation can take considerable skill and training, 
and misinterpretation is not difficult. Without strong experience and 
training, it can be relatively easy to see proof of sinister intent in a benign 
image, or to miss details that would be conclusive to a knowledgeable 
photo interpreter. Again, the concern for policy makers is how that 
increased transparency could at times be a source of added 
instability…Satellite images have the potential, if interpreted incorrectly, to 
increase tensions among nations and create confusion during periods of 
crisis, rather than to promote stability. For example, widespread, incorrect 
interpretations could confound efforts of U.S. national security agencies to 
mediate or diffuse tensions along the India/Pakistan, Syria/Israel borders 
or along the Korean peninsula. This is not just a theoretical problem: in 
one incident, an image that a magazine claimed was the site of India's 
1998 nuclear test turned out to be a livestock pen.”114 
5.3 Imagery Analysis for Nonproliferation Verification: Exemplar 
Cases
115
   
5.3.1. Test Positives: 
Open source “New Media” content, together with commercial satellite imagery 
(and the means to better visualize it in a 3D geospatial context), has made possible a 
host of investigations resulting in somewhat surprising geo-spatial discoveries found in 
otherwise denied environments; and which would have been impossible for anyone not 
previously having the resources of at least a super-power nation state.116 Two such 
examples are provided below. One recent such discovery, involving the work of a small 
team of subject matter experts and interested academics who were able to combine 
otherwise disparate pieces of an information puzzle (found exclusively through the use of 
open sources) into a cohesive and coherent narrative such that they were able to locate, 
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identify, and characterize a potential ballistic missile transport vehicle checkout complex 
in DPRK.  The second example is a case involving the location and identification of 
potential gas centrifuge manufacturing related facilities in the DPRK.  
5.3.1.1 Exemplar: A Potential Ballistic Missile Transporter Checkout Complex in 
the DPRK 
 
In an interesting case study account, Bryan Lee, Jeffrey Lewis, and Melissa 
Hanham, describe how they were able to identify and characterize two potential locations 
for ballistic missile transporter equipment checkout in North Korea by simply engaging 
the New Media.117  
 
On April 15, 2012, the North Koreans paraded what appeared to be six road-
mobile intercontinental (KN-08) ballistic missiles. Analysts working at the James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies together with collegial Armscontrolwonk bloggers in 
Washington, DC, and Vienna, Austria, were able to follow-up on blog posts by Chinese 
bloggers concerning what were identified as Chinese origin vehicles modified to make 
them suitable as mobile erector launchers for those missiles. 118  Using information 
published by Joshua Pollock, they were able to view a video from North Korea that 
depicted ballistic missiles on mobile transporters inside of buildings exhibiting unique 
elevated roof sections. By closely studying both the parade photos and the frame stills of 
the buildings from the video, together with dimensioned specifications as found on online 
brochures for the Chinese origin vehicles,  those analysts were able to create digital 3D 
models of the transporters, missiles, and the buildings (using freely available modelling 
software downloaded from the web) to gain a sense of not only what the buildings would 
look like on the outside, but also the role of the unusual elevated roof sections, and how 
they would provide the means to operationally check-out the erector portion of a missile 
transporter while under roof cover.119 Based on open defector reporting, they were able 
to locate two buildings on Google Earth that met those criteria.120 
 
As the analysts reported in a more comprehensive report, all of the information 
that they used was derived from only open sources as found on the internet, but they 
were able to successively pick up additional pieces of the puzzle as they continued their 
investigation. That investigation involved, to one degree or another, all of what the 
authors defined as the five New Media functional venues: 1) content (e.g., Blogs), 2) 
social networking (for analysis and translations), 3) data mining (Google Earth’s 
layering), 4) problem solving (determining the search area with cluster of defense sites), 
and 5) gaming (simulation 3D modelling).121 
 
In those authors’ own case study review, they describe the steps necessary for 
such results and begin with project “Planning.”  However, project planning was actually a 
subsequent event, as it was only because of the original unforeseen event (involving the 
parade display of the purported KN-08 missile and its transporter) that initially triggered 
a domino effect and initiated the subsequent follow-up project planning. 
 
For the record, at least some, if not all, of the six KN-08s on parade were judged 
by some observers to be merely mock-ups.122 Moreover, even the best remote analysis 
cannot be proven as a true positive without additional source corroboration, ideally with 
onsite inspection, but such analyses can provide valuable starting points for any 
subsequent enquiries. 
5.3.1.2 Exemplar: Potential Gas Centrifuge Workshops in the DPRK 
 In June 2013, R. Scott Kemp, did a guest post on the Armscontrolwonk where he 
noted the identification of a flow forming machines (suitable for making gas centrifuge 
rotors) at what was described as the Kanggye General Tractor Plant in a publicly 
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released photo by North Korean media.123 In September 2013, Jeffrey Lewis, in two 
additional posts on the Armscontrolwonk blog, described some additional investigative 
work that he had conducted together with Amber Lee on that facility and other reporting 
of additional computer controlled machine tool workshops in North Korea. 124,125 They 
compiled North Korean and South Korean press reporting of North Korean defector 
accounts, as previously culled and shared by researchers on other North Korea focused 
blogs.  They then conducted their own research on Google Earth to correlate and locate 
various published ground images. They determined the physical location of a previously 
unknown potential site for gas centrifuge component manufacturing in the DPRK at the 
Huichon Ryonha General Machinery Plant. Based upon a number of interesting 
observations drawing from the derived information from the New Media, they appear to 
have made a plausible case.  
5.4 False Positives: Mistaken Identities and a Means to Avoid 
Them 
 
Just as the above cases illustrate some surprising positive results that can arise 
having significant nonproliferation monitoring and verification consequences, negative 
results can also arise that can nonetheless prove useful as well.  Moreover history has 
shown that even large facilities can either be overlooked or misidentified.126,127  However, 
before we begin this section, which also involves the detection and site characterization 
by remote means, it is worth taking a moment to reflect on this additional quote from 
David B. Sandalow: 
 
“Imagery interpretation can take considerable skill and training, and 
misinterpretation is not difficult. Without strong experience and training, it can be 
relatively easy to see proof of sinister intent in a benign image, or to miss details that 
would be conclusive to a knowledgeable photo interpreter.”128  
5.4.1 Exemplar: “Mystery Complex” in China (in actuality a group of 
industrial facilities for commercial purposes) 
In one mistaken identity incident, which occurred in early 2013, there was an 
over-reaction to a posting on a Wired Magazine Blog regarding some new construction in 
China that had been observed on Google Earth.  A person who identified himself as “an 
ex-CIA analyst” had identified what he labeled a “Mystery Complex”, which was 
suggestive that it had some kind of potentially sinister functionality. The media hype 
stopped abruptly when the noted geospatial blogger, Stefan Geens, was contacted by a 
reporter.  Geens explained the realities: “Yes, the reporter called me to talk, which is 
when I realized this non-story was going viral, so after we stopped chatting I wrote up 
something on my blog.”129 Geens then blogged that the “mystery complex” was nothing 
more than a benign new industrial park, drawing both from his skills as an experienced 
imagery analyst along with  personal experience in the area and knowing the cultural 
context, and was thus able to speak with additional authority. 
5.4.2 Exemplar: A suspect gas centrifuge facility in Syria (in actuality a 
cotton textile plant 
One exemplar case of a false positive involved the identification and 
characterization of a cotton spinning plant in Hakasa, in northeast Syria, which had 
originally been alleged to have been under international scrutiny as a possible 
undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment facility. 130  With a bit of New Media sleuthing, 
involving a host of New Media sources, including social media photo sharing sites, and 
volunteered blogger/reader assistance (a German journalist, Paul-Anton Krüger, 
interviewed the chief engineer who constructed the Syrian cotton spinning plant) and 
some 3D modelling by Tamara Patton,131 it was possible to make a compelling dispelling 
argument.132 All of the available evidence pointed to the conclusion that the facility, 
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while initially justified as being a focus of additional enquiry (based upon the implications 
of such an allegation), was nothing more than a cotton spinning plant. Moreover, in the 
event that an IAEA onsite inspection is ever conducted for transparency and verification 
purposes, such collected background information would prove to be quite useful.  
5.4.3 Exemplar: A cylindrical concrete foundation suggestive of a 
reactor under construction in Iran (in actuality a large cylindrical hotel 
under construction) 
As was shown in above case, innocuous facilities have the potential to be 
mistaken for undeclared facilities of potential interest for treaty monitoring and 
verification, particularly during early construction phases.  One such example can be 
found where a large, deep and circular excavation had been observable in an area north 
of, and near, Shiraz. Shiraz is a city in southwest Iran that will be the location of a 10-
MWth research reactor, according to declarations Iran has provided to the IAEA.133 Using 
Google Earth historical archive imagery during the early construction phase of the site in 
question, the concrete foundation work exhibited some of the physical features that 
could have been suggestive of what had previously been observed during the early 
phase of construction of the IR-40 reactor at Arak, Iran. However, various social media 
user content, involving Panoramio posted ground photos and virtual globe labelling, 
along with associated links to appropriate descriptive construction websites, would have 
quickly dispelled any nuclear connection. The circular concrete foundation was 
identifiable as merely that for a 30-story cylindrically shaped hotel (now almost complete, 
and adjacent to what is now the largest shopping mall in the Middle East). 134 (See 
Figures 15 and 16) Moreover, the Google Earth historical imagery layer also reveals 
that the site was an amusement park in 2005.  
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Figure 15:  False Positive Exemplar, A. Left side shows the Arak, IR-40 (40 MWth), radioisotope 
production reactor under construction in 2005; the right side shows a large concrete structure 
under construction having somewhat similar attributes. 
Figure 16:  False Positive Exemplar, B. Left side shows the Arak, IR-40 (40MWth), radioisotope 
production reactor externally complete in 2014; the right side shows a 30-story cylindrical hotel 
nearly complete in 2014. 
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5.5 The Threats 
 
“High-resolution satellite images could be used to support terrorism, espionage or 
military aggression, and thus must be a national security and foreign policy concern of 
the United States.  We must continue to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy 
interests. On this, there can be no compromise.” 
- David B. Sandalow (June 2000) 
 
While this was only mere speculation in 2000 (just as one meter was becoming 
available for use by the public at large), history has shown David Sandalow to have been 
correct.  The availability of worldwide high resolution commercial satellite imagery can 
also be used by those seeking to do harm at various levels.  Insurgent forces had 
reportedly used commercial satellite imagery available via Google Earth to plan attacks 
on US bases in southern Iraq,135 and terrorists similarly reportedly planned attacks in the 
Mumbai bombings in 2008.136 For more on this see: 
 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/ 
 
This, sad to say, is the case for all such new technologies, e.g., while computers 
can be used by some people for humanitarian purposes, they can also be used by others 
to commit crimes against humanity. 
 
5.6 Evasion and Countermeasures  
 
Deliberate efforts to thwart the identification of clandestine nuclear installations 
began in the United States with the Manhattan Project during World War II, most 
notably by establishing nuclear materials production and processing facilities (e.g., Oak 
Ridge gaseous diffusion plant and the Hanford plutonium production complex) and the 
weaponization site (Los Alamos) in remote locations with limited access under cover 
names with only post office boxes instead of addresses. The Soviet Union followed suit 
with even more dramatic measures for its nuclear weapons program. One example was 
in Zheleznogorsk/Krasnoyarsk-26 where three plutonium production reactors and a 
reprocessing plant were built entirely underground inside a mountain along the Yenisei 
River. 137   Nonetheless, “The Soviet Union also was unable to hide from overhead 
imagery systems its huge nuclear weapons production infrastructure. By 1965, the US 
intelligence program had correctly identified and characterized facilities with more 
obvious nuclear signatures, including all fissile material production centers, some 
uranium processing facilities, the Sarov warhead R&D center, the serial warhead 
assembly facilities in Lesnoy and Trekhgorny.”138 China was similarly adept at hiding key 
nuclear infrastructures, as most of its second generation of nuclear weapons related 
facilities was placed in or around the Szechwan basin, which is usually obscured by low 
clouds. It had even begun (but never completed) construction of an underground 
plutonium production complex similar to the one in the Soviet Union, with evidence that 
another was also planned.139,140 
 
Camouflage, concealment, and deception in association with nuclear program 
infrastructures have been applied by many other countries as well, For Example:   
 
South Africa: The Circle nuclear weapons fabrication and assembly facility was 
built within the confines of a conventional military vehicle test track. A criticality test 
facility and initial nuclear explosive device assembly buildings were constructed in a 
visually obscured valley behind the Pelindaba nuclear research center.141   
 
Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons effort placed his two electromagnetic 
Isotope Separation (EMIS) facilities along the Tigris River in an isolated valley (Ash 
Arkat) and in a huge date palm grove (Tarmiya) for ground level visual obscurity.  High 
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voltage electric power line connections were placed underground at Tarmiya for over 
about 1.5 kilometers to inhibit identification from overhead observation.142   
 
Iran: The two known underground uranium enrichment plants in Iran at Natanz 
and Fordow were both originally covertly built underground in remote locations with 
cover stories.  The one at Natanz was said to have had the cover story of being for anti-
desertification, and the one at Fordow (near Qom) was built on a military reservation to 
suggest that it had only a conventional military related role.143 Natanz also included 
signature suppression of electrical service with regard to buried utility connections and 
an enclosed electric substation that was constructed to look like an innocuous workshop.  
The only vehicle access to the underground area was concealed under a false façade 
constructed to look like a simple warehouse.144   
 
Syria: Syria employed similar subterfuge with its allegedly North Korean assisted 
plutonium production reactor at Al Kibar (identified as Dair Alzhour by the IAEA†) by 
constructing it in a remote location, using terrain masking, and applying a variety of 
signature suppression techniques that included buried utilities and minimal observable 
onsite physical security. Most importantly, the reactor was built largely below grade with 
the reactor superstructure camouflaged under a false façade that was constructed to 
make the building appear simply as another one of several locale Byzantine fortresses 
situated along that stretch of the Euphrates River.145  
 
Interestingly enough, the only publicly available means by which it was possible 
to determine the date of initial construction of the Al Kibar reactor (e.g., ~late July 
2001) was via middle to very low resolution publicly available satellite imagery (varying 
from 80-250 meters) including that provided by ASTER and Landsat.146 The commercial 
imagery archives of various vendors are currently accessible at no cost at similar low-
resolution thumbnail versions and hence can be similarly also used for such “negation” 
dating.  A negation date is the last date of imagery when a facility or activity was not 
extant, but which is known to be present afterward. 
 
The exponential growth of commercial satellite imaging satellites has only 
increased the likelihood of the use of camouflage concealment and deception against 
overhead detection, identification, and assessment.  In 2006, a Chinese Military journal 
contained an article that Google (Earth) “has broken the monopoly position of traditional 
line-drawn maps and ushered in a new era of electronic maps [but] has also brought a 
certain amount of hidden security-related dangers that pose threats to every country 
and region.” The author recommended the adoption of “various methods and measures 
and do all we can to get around the problems brought about by Google Earth and 
minimize the impact it has on national security,” and stressed “the importance of anti-
reconnaissance against satellites, properly camouflaging and protecting important secret 
facilities, and understanding a satellite's shooting intervals, which could be used for 
conducting major military activities.” 147  India and Norway have also both reportedly 
implemented such evasions and countermeasures by developing ways of “hiding defense 
installations from satellites, and would find other ways such as concealing buildings 
underground and in mountain installations.”148 Such efforts are not surprising, have been 
extensively employed since the dawn of aerial reconnaissance, and are rarely completely 
successful.149 
 
 
 
                                           
† “the Agency assesses that it is very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was 
a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency.” Source: “Implementation of 
the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” GOV/2011/30, Paragraph 33, May 
24, 2011.  
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6. Commercial Satellite Imagery Is a Subset of the Larger 
Expanding “Open-Source” and “New Media” Information 
Data Stream 
In late 2011, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, described 
the need to enhance and augment old verification methods, and to create new ones, and 
to integrate them as a system for more effective verification.150 The rapidly expanding 
use of the Internet as a global social networking forum and the increasing number of 
venues available for collaborative information sharing (aka “crowdsourcing”) of news, 
photos, and videos, together with geo-tagging and geo-positioning on commercial 
satellite imagery, has created new opportunities for data-mining of just such potential 
arms control relevance. The resulting geospatially-linked data can include information on 
nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure or strategic weapons systems sites, facilities, complexes, 
and associated materials, equipment, activities, and personnel. This data could provide a 
basis for new and important insights for treaty monitoring and verification.  
  
This form of “societal verification” can be provided as posts to the blogs or simply 
as labels on information layers on the open available “virtual globes,” in particular 
Google Earth and Google Maps, which host high resolution commercial satellite imagery 
that is viewable in a three-dimensional context.  Several publicly available geospatially-
linked ground imagery sharing venues (e.g., Twitter, Flickr, Panoramio, Lookr, 
Wikimapia151) can provide useful correlative information of potential relevance. Examples 
of existing commercial satellite imagery-based crowdsourcing platforms that could be 
applied to societal verification include (e.g., the Ushahidi Project, Tomnod, Bellingcat, or, 
in the case of human rights monitoring and analysis during the South Sudan 
independent transition, the Satellite Sentinel Project). One site, Open Nuclear Iran152, 
has already been tailored toward nonproliferation-specific issues. Another particularly 
powerful geospatially-based social media search tool is EchoSec 153 , which recently 
gained notoriety in obtaining geospatially-linked information from multiple social media 
venues like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Foursquare, and the Russian equivalent to 
Facebook known as VK.154  
 
Several organizations and academic open-source analytical teams are currently 
leading the way in applying these multiple sources of crowdsourced and other 
geospatially relevant derived data with commercial satellite imagery to yield new 
multiple-source synergy relevant for nuclear nonproliferation applications (e.g., the 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey and its Vienna Center for 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; the King’s College London Alpha Project; the 
Institute for Science and International Security; the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre, etc.).  
 
Finally, just as this report was being compiled, commercial satellite imagery in 
combination with various new media tools now accessible via the internet continues to 
provide new and insightful value-added open source information for verification 
applications (particularly so when used creatively in the hands of experienced 
practitioners). The most recent case involves the open source follow-up of the Iranian 
dissident group (the National Council for the Resistance of Iran, NCRI) allegations of an 
underground gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant in northeastern Tehran (identified 
as “Lavizan 3,” thereby linking it to the NCRI’s previously identified nuclear weapons 
program facility in the neighborhood known as Lavizan155). The documentation of that 
follow-up makes a very worthwhile read. 156  The alleged underground uranium 
enrichment plant was shown to be most likely a security identification badge processing 
center (“Matiran”) based on the creative use by Jeffrey Lewis of “Open Street Map” 
(http://www.openstreetmap.org/) in which he found a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
track of a European technician who had visited the facility, and with whom Jeffrey was 
able to subsequently contact via email.  As a result, Jeffrey was able to make a strong 
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case for the facility having the security badge processing function.157 Separately, another 
researcher, Phil Baxter, found other open-source evidence that undercut the validity of 
the allegations.158 Most significantly, a blogger going by the name of “Florida Democrat” 
showed that the NCRI’s published photographic evidence, purporting to have been taken 
inside the underground facility, was actually cropped from an above ground photograph 
published in an online corporate brochure.159  Further doubt could be cast on the claim 
that the alleged enrichment plant was “Lavizan 3” by the simple fact that commercial 
satellite imagery showed that its construction had begun while the first Lavizan site was 
still in operation in March 2003, when that site was first publicly revealed by the NCRI. 
According to the NCRI, Lavizan 1 was subsequently moved to Lavizan 2 in 2003, and 
commercial satellite imagery showed that the site of Lavizan 1 was razed and replaced 
with a public park in 2004.160   
It is perhaps also worth noting that Robert Cardillo, the Director of the US 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, addressed this new “open-source” paradigm 
shift (which he even identified as effectuating a “Seismic Shift”). “The explosion of data 
and access outside of the government’s control – Darkening Skies of small sats, global 
expansion of social media, and the Internet of Things....The smallsat constellation will 
continuously image thousands of facilities and activities across countries and 
continents—true global coverage…We must fully leverage nontraditional sources, 
especially open sources, and integrate them continuously in real-time with all of our 
other capabilities. We must do so throughout the day, all night, in all weather conditions, 
every day of the year, across the spectrum of sensors in the face of sophisticated denial 
and deception and both natural and man-made interference.”161  
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7. Conclusion  
Commercial satellite imagery has already been proven to be a timely, accurate 
data source to support, supplement, and/or enhance nuclear related ongoing treaty 
monitoring and verification activities. Such imagery will also continue to be an enabler of 
independent action, in that it democratizes the availability and use of the medium by 
anyone in the world with digital information technology access (including smart phones), 
thereby limiting the control of what had been only a few central governments.  It was 
recently noted that, “data availability, data storage, and current transfer speeds put 
unprecedented compute power in the hands of the average person. Globally, people will 
be able to collectively wield the same power as a nation state in terms of information 
and intelligence creation.”162 
   
We have just entered a new era of new capabilities in earth observation that 
include large constellations of more agile and capable satellite having improved spatial, 
spectral, and temporal resolutions that even include high definition video.  Those 
capabilities are synergistic in that the sum of derivable information is greater when the 
images are aggregated than the total of the information that they would otherwise 
provide when viewed in isolation. Commercial satellite imagery having global coverage is 
now also being made freely available via digital virtual globes. Moreover that imagery 
can be readily supplemented by focused additional imagery purchases from multiple 
platforms, with multiple sensors, from multiple companies, from multiple nations, and at 
least some can be purchased with only a smart phone for as little as ten US dollars.  
Despite the initial skepticism regarding quality, timeliness of acquisition and delivery, 
cost, and potential defeatablity; commercial satellite imagery has also more than proven 
its worth as a nonproliferation treaty monitoring and verification tool.    
 
With respect to the impact of commercial satellite imagery for verification 
applications, Peter Zimmerman concluded in 1990 that, “If civil remote–sensing systems 
ever achieve resolutions much better that one meter, many or the details of aircraft, 
missiles, and armored vehicles as well as of military installations would be visible to 
anyone with a modest bank balance and some curiosity.  Were those high-quality 
pictures available on a timely basis, the consequences might be significant.” The 
consequences have indeed already been proven to be significant. As the supporting 
reference material presented here shows, the work by various academic researchers, 
NGO researchers, and even hobbyists, creatively using commercial satellite imagery for 
verification applications has visually exposed numerous cases of heretofore clandestine 
facilities and illicit activities worldwide. As commercial satellite imagery capabilities and 
usage continue to evolve, those consequences for future verification efforts can only 
grow in significance. 
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Appendix A: What Do the Virtual Globes Bring to the 
Verification Toolkit?  
Virtual globes (e.g., Google’s Google Earth, including the “Pro” version which has  
advanced capabilities and recently became cost-free) 163, Nokia’s here164, Microsoft’s 
Bing Maps165, Flash Earth166, Apple's iOS 7 3D Maps167, Skyline Globe168, Géoportail169, 
and Bhuvan 170 , eAtlas 171 , etc.) are generally cost-free, but proprietary.  They are 
generally versatile, readily accessible and user-friendly versions of what are known 
as Geographic Information Systems (GIS), which are designed to “capture, store, 
manipulate, analyze, manage and represent geographically referenced data.” 172  In 
general, most GIS (ESRI’s ArcGIS Explorer173 is among the more widely known) are 
powerful applications that require professionally trained experts (and hence less 
intuitive than Virtual Globes) and which have capabilities that go beyond what is most 
often necessary for the imagery analysis and visualization purposes of greatest 
relevance to this report. Nonetheless, ESRI’s ArcGIS website does offer some unique 
base map satellite imagery via My Map174 that is both openly available and useful for the 
purposes of this study (see discussion below regarding the exemplar of Irbil, Iraq).175  
 
Virtual globes are more than adequate for even a novice to virtually fly to any 
place on earth and gather information in a 3D geospatial context. They also provide a 
platform for additional information layers, which can include 3D structural models, 
additional separately purchased satellite images, and “crowdsourced” information such 
as labeling and ground images.  While never sufficient as sole sources of such geospatial 
information, they have evolved to the point to where they can provide the necessary 
stepping stone upon which to embark for any subsequent commercial satellite imagery 
acquisition and analyses.  Virtual globes have thus proven critical to providing the 
necessary locational and temporal awareness for nuclear infrastructure analysis, and 
can support any ongoing safeguards monitoring and verification applications in the open 
source realm, and because the satellite imagery is available on an essentially cost-free 
basis, also contributes to the overall financial resource efficiency of the Agency. 
 
IAEA policy places certain limitations on the use of commercial satellite imagery 
and hence that which is provided as well on virtual globes. Imagery analysis is only to 
be used for the purposes of Safeguards verification. Moreover, while all State declared 
locations are subject to imaging, the IAEA is reportedly restricted from conducting any 
“systematic, countrywide search for undeclared activities.” Nonetheless, commercial 
satellite imagery “may be used in conjunction with complementary information that 
localizes a suspected activity.”  There are also requirements for imagery source 
diversification (multi-national) and for both security and confidentiality. 176  However, 
while the IAEA may not be specifically authorized to conduct broad area searches on its 
own, it would seem that it might at least leverage the use of openly available work 
published by others who have independently conducted broad area searches of entire 
countries on their own initiative.  Some examples can be found in the Ogle Earth type 
blog postings177  or in or in the Google Earth Community blog at least one blogger 
(“TheAmazingEye”) went to the trouble of trying to label all the tunnels and 
underground sites in Iran and created a file that can be opened in Google Earth.178 
A1. Not all Virtual Globes Were Created Equal 
 
When thinking of virtual globes, one most often thinks exclusively of Google 
Earth179.  Of all the virtual globes available, Google Earth180 is by far most useful for a 
variety of reasons (that will be described below), however, one must be fully cognizant 
that Google Earth does not always offer imagery of the requisite resolution, either 
spatial or temporal, for all areas of the world to adequately conduct the overhead 
imagery reviews necessary to support all state evaluations. Just as one should not rely 
exclusively on only one open-source search engine (e.g., Google), one should not rely 
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exclusively on a single virtual globe when searching for available online commercial 
satellite imagery. While Google Earth should almost always be viewed as the virtual 
globe of first resort, multiple virtual globes should always be accessed as part of any 
comprehensive analysis.  
 
For example, Figures 17 & 18 compare the latest high resolution imagery of 
Irbil, Iraq, as currently  available on Google Earth with that which can be found on two 
popular alternative virtual globes.  Somewhat surprisingly, Google Earth’s most recent 
high resolution imagery is over a decade old (from 2004), while those which are 
available on both “Flash Earth” (which includes imagery from several sources including 
“ArcGIS”), Microsoft’s “Bing Maps”,  and “Here” (formerly Nokia Maps 3D) are from 
2011, 2013, and 2014 respectively.  One must also be cognizant of the fact that the 
satellite imagery available with these virtual globes is constantly being updated, and so 
what is true today for any given point on earth (e.g., Irbil, Iraq, as accessed for this 
study on March 24, 2015) may not necessarily be true tomorrow. 
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Irbil, Iraq, on “Google Earth”
Latest high resolution imagery 
available: 6 September 2004
Irbil, Iraq, on “here”
Latest high resolution 
imagery available:              
5 January  2014
(NOTE :Yahoo! Maps and  Apple's iOS 7 3D 
Maps HAS THE SAME IMAGERY AS HERE)
Irbil, Iraq, on “Flash Earth”
Latest high resolution 
imagery available:
8 October 2011
Empire City, Oct 2011
Empire City, May 2012
Naz City, Oct 2009
New 
Airport
New 
Airport
No Development
Irbil
Irbil
Irbil
Panoramio
Panoramio
Panoramio
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: A comparison of commercial satellite imagery as is available on three different virtual 
globes: Google Earth (top), Flash Earth, and Here. The Google Earth image is over a decade old 
and does not show the substantial changes that include the addition of a new skyscraper city and 
international airport in the vicinity of Irbil, Iraq. 
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Irbil, Iraq, on “Google Earth”
Latest high resolution imagery 
available: 6 September 2004
Irbil, Iraq, on “here”
Latest high resolution 
imagery available:               
5 January  2014
Irbil, Iraq, on 
“Bing Maps”
Latest high resolution 
imagery available:
25 May 2013
No Development
Image © 2015 DigitalGlobe, Inc.
Image © 2015 DigitalGlobe, Inc.
“Empire City”
“Empire City”
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: A comparison of commercial satellite imagery as is available on three different virtual 
globes, Close-up: Google Earth (top), Bing Maps (middle), and Here (bottom). The Google Earth 
image is over a decade old and does not show the substantial changes that include the addition of 
numerous multi-story buildings, roads, and traffic jams in the vicinity of Irbil, Iraq. 
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A2. Dates of Imagery Acquisition Are Critical for Any Analysis  
 
The satellite imagery that is available on virtual globes will be of little use for 
nonproliferation purposes if it cannot be determined when such imagery was acquired.  
The only deficiency with both of the above mentioned alternative virtual globes is that 
neither directly provides the specific date of imagery acquisition as does Google Earth.  
Nonetheless, the exact dates can be still be indirectly derived.  This is because each 
virtual globe does display their respective commercial satellite imagery source (e.g., the 
commercial satellite imagery vendors such as DigitalGlobe, Airbus 181 , etc.).  Such 
information is sufficient information to conduct an appropriate historical search of the 
named vendor’s satellite imagery archive.   Furthermore, the date range of that archival 
search can be significantly narrowed from the decade since the Google Earth image was 
acquired (reduced to only the last four years) by comparison of the substantial new 
building construction progress in the Irbil suburbs vis-à-vis that which is observable on 
commercial satellite imagery that is viewable on the openly accessible ESRI ArcGIS 
website.  ArcGIS does provide the imagery dates of acquisition in the metadata 
associated with each “Imagery Basemap” image182 (for the case of Irbil, the ArcGIS 
imagery is sourced to DigitalGlobe and was acquired on July 5, 2010). Bing Maps 
MetaData is also available (at least the month and year, not the exact date) by using 
this application: http://mvexel.dev.openstreetmap.org/bing/. 
 
After having thus determined that both images were acquired post-July 2010 
(e.g., both images show a completed tall hotel in the Empire City development that was 
only in the early stages of construction on the ArcGIS image), it is also possible to get 
an approximate date for each by comparing the construction status of new buildings 
with date-tagged ground imagery from the Panoramio layer on Google Earth (as is 
shown in the insets on Figure 1).  Moreover, it was also possible to determine relative 
dates, in that the Here imagery was clearly the more recent of the two (e.g., more 
buildings had been newly constructed).   Figure 2 provides a close-up of one area of the 
Irbil, Iraq, suburbs (known as Empire City), which has undergone the fastest and most 
substantial growth (along with dramatic increases in vehicle traffic as well). 
 
However, to get the exact date of the two different satellite imagery acquisitions, 
the next step was to search the archives of the copyrighted source of the imagery.  In 
this exemplar case, both are sourced to DigitalGlobe. To access the DigitalGlobe 
archives, one must go to this link: 
 https://browse.digitalglobe.com/imagefinder/main.jsp? 
   
The next step is to zoom into the area of interest, in this case Irbil, Iraq.  Then 
one should reduce the number of possible images to a minimum by adjusting the 
“search filter183” acquisition date range to post-July 2010, shown in Figure 3, middle left.  
Next, one must click on the “Search” button and, in this case, “13 images meet your 
filter criteria”.  By clicking on the catalogue tab, and clicking on “view list,” the list of all 
nearly cloud free images appears (as is shown in the bottom of Figure 3).  Then, by 
checking the various browse image boxes, the images can be viewed overlain on the 
accompanying search map.  When an image appears that appears as though it might be 
a good candidate, the next step is to click on the browse image “view” link. Then, a new 
separate metadata box viewer opens, and a small browser image appears.  An internally 
displayed “image resize” inset box also appears and usually displays “512 x 512” (e.g., 
small scale). However, by clicking on that tab arrow on the right of that little box, one 
option is “max available resolution,” which will open the selected browser image at a 
high enough resolution (e.g., large scale) to make a valid comparison with the images 
visible in both Flash Earth and Here (see figure 3, lower right). 
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The actual process of determining the exact date of acquisition involves careful 
visual comparison of the features observable in the DigitalGlobe archive with those 
viewable in the Flash Earth and Here.  Among the features useful for comparison include 
the angle and length of shadows cast by the tallest buildings, the presence of identical 
features (no more and no less) on the ground, where the features can either be 
anthropogenic (buildings, roads, parks, gardens) or natural (e.g., water levels in 
streams), or the presence or absence of clouds, smoke, or contrails, etc.  For example, 
Figure 19 shows that it is rather straightforward to determine that the Flash Earth 
Image was acquired on October 8, 2011, as the presence, orientation, and length of the 
short lived visible smoke plumes serve as an image identification fingerprint. The Here 
image was a bit more difficult, particularly given slight differences due to image color 
processing and ortho-rectification, but was similarly determined to have been acquired 
on January 5, 2014. 
 
There are also two additional, and very important, side benefits of the above 
process involving the “max resolution available” browser imagery with the DigitalGlobe 
archive.  By reviewing all of the available imagery of one’s area of interest, it is possible 
to also determine 1) whether purchase of the full resolution version of the more current 
imagery is warranted, and 2) the browser images can be used as online low-resolution 
reference library for quickly answering questions regarding dates of construction for 
many larger infrastructure changes such as the excavation of a new uranium open pit 
mine, or the construction or razing of large fuel-cycle processing buildings, or the 
construction timelines of roads, rail lines, bridges, tunnels, and perhaps even utility 
lines/nodes, etc. 
 
 Another option to quickly peruse low-resolution versions of the majority of 
available high resolution imagery archives is to use a meta-search engine like Apollo 
Mapping’s “Image Hunter” https://imagehunter.apollomapping.com/. That service is 
provided to expedite commercial satellite imagery sales through Apollo Mapping as a 
vendor, for which it is quite useful. However, it also makes it easy to locate high 
resolution imagery over any area of interest in such a way that you can use it as a cost-
free means to determine the timing of significant changes like facility and road 
construction in previously undeveloped areas. 
 
Finally, with regard to imagery archives, one must also be cognizant of the fact 
that some areas of interest can be deemed as “sensitive” by the US Government, and 
potentially subject US commercial satellite imagery vendors to US Government 
mandated distribution restrictions (thereby imposing “limited access,” sometimes also 
known as “shutter control”), which could prevent some US-sourced satellite imagery 
from being available in any publicly accessible archive systems.  As a result, one must 
always also review the archives of non-US commercial satellite imagery vendors when 
seeking to obtain the latest available high resolution imagery for any given requisite 
area of interest. 
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Smoke plumes
Irbil
Smoke plumes
Irbil
Irbil, Iraq, on “Flash Earth” 
(using Bing Maps)
Latest high resolution 
imagery available:
8 October 2011                   
(as derived by comparing 
visible smoke plumes with 
those on Digital Globe 
archival imagery)
Digital Globe Archive “Image Finder”
Digital Globe archive “Image Finder” 
catalogue list after acquisition date-range filtering
Digital Globe 
Archive 
“max 
available 
resolution” 
Browser 
image from 
8 October 
2011
The “How-to” Guide for 
Deriving Image Acquisition 
Dates
“Flash Earth” image
Digital Globe archive
Figure 19: The acquisition dates of commercial satellite imagery that are not provided on some 
virtual globes can be deduced via a careful comparison search of imagery vendor archives. In this 
case the smoke plumes serve as a temporal “fingerprint”.  
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A3. Advantages of Google Earth 
 
Aside from the exemplar case of Iraq, as a virtual globe and layman’s GIS, 
Google Earth does however offer some unique and important capabilities that should not 
be overlooked.  
1) Google Earth is the only virtual globe to offer an historical commercial satellite 
imagery layer by which one can readily monitor changes and derive the necessary 
temporal context to support verification of facility related activities.  One quirk of Google 
Earth is that the image viewed of an area when Google Earth is first opened is not 
necessarily the most currently available.  In some cases (not all), only after one opens 
up the historical layer (one must click on the Clock icon     ) can the most recent 
acquisition be viewed, if a more recent one happens to be available.  
2) Google Earth provides ground photo viewing layers from Panoramio and Lookr.   
3) Google Earth also offers the unique capability to peruse “crowdsourced” labeling 
via the “Google Earth Community” layer (which is subordinate to the “Gallery” layer), 
and through separate user import of the Wikimapia Keyhole Markup Language (KML) 
layer184.  Please note that similar but separate capabilities for ground photo viewing are 
also available on https://www.flickr.com/map, which includes a multi-resolution satellite 
imagery geo-location layer derived from “Here”. 
4) Google Earth offers the unique capability to review (in a browser format) archived 
imagery from DigitalGlobe (less than one meter over the period from 2002 to early 
2010) and 2.5 meter SPOT imagery from AIRBUS industries over the period 2011-2012). 
5) Google Earth provides the 3D terrain context in a user friendly fashion with 
several viewing options including “photorealistic atmospheric rendering 
(EXPERIMENTAL).”   
6) Google Earth also provides a number of major cities in 3D construction (either via 
the old scheme using Trimble’s SketchUp185 modeling that was all created manually (the 
“legacy” option), or the new default version using models that have been automatically 
generated using laser radar). Most significantly, Google Earth allows one to viewing 
one’s self generated 3D models created separately in SketchUp to be viewed in Google 
Earth’s virtual world 3D terrain context. 
7) There is at least one case that this author is aware of where the Google Earth 3D 
building layer provides much more current imagery (2014 vice 2011), in higher 
resolution (due to it being from aircraft) than is presented with the 3D building layer 
turned off.  
8) Google Earth provides the means to measure linear and path distances (Here 
does also), but in the  Google Earth “Pro” version (which became entirely cost-free in 
2015186), Google Earth allows one to also make measurements of area (e.g., floor 
space), create videos, and create and plot “view sheds” (e.g., line of sight maps from 
any location). 
Note on Here: As of this writing, Here has established itself as a true 
“crowdsourcing” venue whereby anyone can add/change roads and add/change places 
directly onto the Here base map using the “Map Creator” function.  Conceivably, this 
could eventually prove itself to be a useful means by which someone might volunteer 
and post new information of potential relevance to a Safeguards site investigation. 
Note on Bing Maps: As of this writing, Bing Maps has brought back its excellent  
3D building viewing capability for over one hundred major cities (that had been 
available earlier only in Microsoft’s now defunct VirtualEarth) in addition to Bird’s Eye 
viewing, but is only viewable via Microsoft’s Windows 8.1.  Microsoft’s Bing Maps has 
also introduced “Streetside”, which is similar to Google’s “Streetview” (as available on 
both Google Earth and Google Maps), but Streetside presents ground imagery having its 
own unique views as acquired with different cameras, on different dates, in potentially 
different weather conditions.  Microsoft’s Streetside imagery is available in both Bing 
Maps and the Bing Maps Preview app (the latter being exclusively available on Windows 
8.1187). With this latest release, Streetside has now surpassed 100 cities.  While not 
necessarily relevant for many IAEA Safeguards relevant questions, arising from the 
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geographic coverage limitations imposed on such drive-by or aircraft overflight viewing 
(e.g., large swaths of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are not included as of this 
writing).188 It is possible to access both Google Maps Streetview and Bing’s Bird’s Eye 
using “Dual Maps” available at http://www.mashedworld.com/dualmaps.aspx 
A4. Automated 3D Modeling  
Previously, the capability to create 3D models of nuclear relevant facilities, 
infrastructure and equipment for better assessments including walk-arounds or fly-
arounds (e.g., for IAEA inspection planning, etc.) was then limited to only manual 
creation with digital modeling software. Such software included SketchUp (formerly 
owned by Google and now Trimble Navigation’s (previously Google’s), which is viewable 
in Google Earth; while Dassault Systemes’ 3DVia and Geovia, and Sampos’ 3D Visioner, 
are both viewable with Microsoft’s Bing Maps. In the case of SketchUp, crowdsourcing 
volunteers had created 3D models that could be viewed as an additional layer of virtual 
globe content on Google Earth (see the “3D Buildings” layer).  While such models are 
still available for viewing on Google Earth when viewed in legacy mode, Google Earth, in 
the updated Google Earth ver. 7, has enchanced the 3D Building layer to include 3D 
models that have been automatically created via digital stereophotogrammetry using 
high resolution aircraft imagery taken from four different views at a 45 degree angle off 
nadir. According to one recent report, “Google is rolling out 3D at an extraordinary 
rate.”189 Similar automated 3D modeling is also available on other virtual globes like 
Here and Microsoft’s Bing Maps for Windows vers. 8.1190 and the new “maps app for 
Windows 10” comes with new 3D cities of 190 locations191.  Increasingly, the virtual 
globes like Google Earth and Google Maps have begun the quest to “map the planet in 
3D” automatically creating “3D cityscapes, complete with buildings, terrain and even 
landscaping, from 45-degree aerial imagery.”192  
  Until 2015, such automated modeling coverage had been limited to those areas 
allowing such proprietary commercial overflights (Google uses its own aircraft 193 ).  
However, given the increasing agility provided by the new commercial imaging satellites, 
which are now capable of acquiring the same 45-degree perspective imagery at nearly 
equivalent resolutions as aircraft, it was not unexpected that, at some point in the near 
future, the entire world, including denied areas, could be mapped and viewable in 3D on 
virtual globes like Google Earth. The 3D rendering shown in Figure 20 was derived from 
multiple aircraft overflight images acquired on April 10, 2013. The 3D modelling 
(including buildings, trees, bushes, and even vehicles) was created entirely via an 
automated process run by Google.  This could just as well have been any other nuclear 
facility of interest for monitoring and verification purposes. To date, however, such 
“cost-free” modeling remains limited only to areas accessible by aircraft. With the advent 
of highly agile, highly accurate, commercial satellite imaging satellites as are now 
available (e.g., DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-3 ~30 cm resolution and Airbus’s Pléiades 50 
cm resolution), such automated 3D modelling is now also possible for any place on Earth 
with nearly the same fidelity. Notably, in May 2015, a new joint venture company was 
announced between DigitalGlobe and Saab, called Vricon, which has begun offering, on a 
“for-fee” basis, such automated 3D modeling, derived solely from commercial satellite 
imagery.194  One initial exemplar, provided in a promotional video, shows an automated 
3D model of the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility in Iran (See Figure 21).  Similarly, 
Airbus Defence and Space has proven its ability to successfully and accurately produce a 
3D model using thirteen Pléiades images, forming nine stereo pairs, combined to 
produce the 3D model, also viewable in a promotional video. 195 For the foreseeable 
future, however, manual 3D modeling will continue to be required for building interiors 
(see for example: “Approximate 3D Visualization of Yongbyon U-Enrichment Facility by 
Tamara Patton196) 
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3D Buildings layer3D Buildings layer OFF
© Vricon
Figure 20:  The Pickering Nuclear Power Station, Canada, as viewed on Google Earth with the 3D 
Building layer turned ON and OFF (inset).  The 3D rendering was derived from multiple aircraft 
overflight images. The 3D modelling (including buildings, trees, bushes, and even vehicles) was 
created entirely via an automated photogrammetric process operated by Google. 
Figure 21: Perhaps the very first automated 3D model of a nuclear-related facility using only 
commercial satellite imagery created via an entirely automated photogrammetric process (from 
DigitalGlobe) was displayed by Vricon in a promotional video. (See Ref 194) 
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Appendix B: Useful Resources  
Entire blogs and magazines are now dedicated to the trends and developments in 
the rapidly evolving field of imagery analysis using commercial satellite imagery.  Among 
the blogs of greatest import for verification applications include:  
http://www.isis-online.org/;  
http://armscontrolwonk.com/;  
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/category/hans_kristensen; 
http://geimint.blogspot.com/; 
http://ogleearth.com/; 
http://osimint.com/ ; 
https://www.bellingcat.com/  
 
Examples of blogs that are devoted to a single country (e.g., DPRK) that can 
provide additional imagery and contextual analysis include: 
http://38north.org/  
http://www.northkoreatech.org/   
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/  
http://freekorea.us/  
http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com   
http://www.nknews.org/   
http://kcnawatch.nknews.org/  
 
Among the online magazines are: 
Trajectory http://trajectorymagazine.com/; 
Earth Imaging Journal http://eijournal.com/; 
Apogeo http://apogeospatial.com/  
(formerly Imaging Notes http://www.imagingnotes.com/) 
Pathfinder https://www1.nga.mil/mediaroom/Publications/Pages/default.aspx  
Geospatial Intelligence Forum 
 http://www.kmimediagroup.com/images/magazine-pdf/GIF_13-1_FINAL.pdf 
Directions Magazine 
 http://www.directionsmag.com/  
Earth Observation Portal Newsletter 
https://eoportal.org/web/eoportal  
 
Other Geospatial background resources can be found here: 
https://www1.nga.mil/Pages/default.aspx 
http://www.defence.gov.au/AGO/  
http://www.satcen.europa.eu/  
http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/default-eo.asp  
http://www.unitar.org/unosat/  
http://www.unoosa.org/ 
http://news.satimagingcorp.com/  
http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-11-06467 
http://defensetech.org/about-defense-tech/  
 
Among the best all-around blogs for commercial satellite imagery development 
news is: 
http://www.gearthblog.com/(because it is not just about Google Earth).  There are 
numerous other related links to be found there as well e.g., 
http://www.gearthblog.com/reference   
 
The US Government published a student handbook on photo interpretation that is 
useful for understanding various industrial process and observable features associated 
with them as well as a cursory look at the nuclear fuel cycle and related infrastructure.  
Please see: 
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 http://sites.miis.edu/geospatialtools2013/files/2012/07/Photo-Interpretation-
Student-Handbook.-Photo-Interpretation-Principles.pdf    
 
Another unique source for insights on the art and science of imagery analysis can 
be found here: http://osimint.com/?s=I%26A+vol&submit.x=0&submit.y=0&submit=Go  
 
This blog is entitled: Open Source IMINT http://osimint.com/  which also has a 
real time twitter feed. That website includes archived work by Sean O’Conner with 
excellent quizzes on the last page of each issue of IMINT & Analysis found here: 
 http://osimint.com/resources/imint-analysis/ia-volume-1/  and 
 http://osimint.com/resources/imint-analysis/ia-volume-2/m.  One way to 
monitor is simply insert the search term “nuclear” 
http://osimint.com/?s=nuclear&submit.x=0&submit.y=0   
 
There is some additional supplementary material associated with this author’s 
previous textbook chapter on commercial satellite imagery for safeguards applications.  
Please see:  
http://booksite.elsevier.com/9780750686730/casestudies/Chapter%20Annexes.doc  
 
Note: Although some of the links are no longer active, this page can still serve as a 
useful reference for anyone interested in geospatial tools for verification purposes. Most, 
if not all of the links may still also be accessible via the Internet Archive 
WayBackMachine at https://archive.org/web/web.php. 
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Appendix C: Summary of what’s really NEW since 2008 (the 
year of the previous textbook chapter by this author on this 
subject) 
 
We can conclude by saying that since the last review by this author on the 
subject of the use of commercial satellite imagery for nonproliferation applications, the 
significant increase in the number of satellites (including “small sats” and “nano 
satellites” and ISS basing) have created a new environment of “rapid revisits” almost to 
the point of “persistent surveillance” while also providing imagery that is much closer to 
“near real-time;” as well as: 
 
a) Additional acquisition time windows are becoming available, e.g., it is no longer only 
late-morning (~10:30 to 11:00 am). Various vendors are in the implementation 
stage of providing imagery at all hours of the day or night. (See the example in 
Figure 5) 
b) HD and UHD video from space is now available. Skybox and Urthecast are both new 
exemplar companies providing video.  (See the nighttime video freeze-frame in 
Figure 5) 
c) Improved agility and off-nadir viewing, including one-pass, multi-looks has now 
become routinely possible. (See Figure 6). 
d) 25 cm resolution imagery is now legally authorized in the United States (previously 
limited to 50 cms for a decade).  This is a 400% improvement allowance (four 
pixels at 25 cms for every one previously at 50 cms). (See Figure 7) 
e) Short-Wavelength Infrared (SWIR) imagery at 3.7 meter resolution is now available 
via WorldView-3 allowing significantly improved visibility through smoke and haze 
(See Figure 8). 
f) More spectral bands are now available. Hyperspectral (~200 spectral bands) using 
satellites may not work for nonproliferation verification applications without 
improved resolution, but more selective bands (“Superspectral” or “hybrid 
hyperspectral” ~20-30 spectral bands) may be successful for identifying specific 
verification relevant materials and minerals like uranium and thorium. 
g) Mid-Wavelength Infrared (MWIR) imagery at 5.5 meter resolution is now available 
via KOMPSAT 3-A, which can be used to study emitted thermal radiation during 
observations during the night.  This could have a profound impact 
h) Smart Phone apps have been created to track commercial satellite imaging satellites 
and alert users to when imagery is available of their particular areas of interest and 
then to preview the imagery prior to possible purchase. Imagery of areas as small as 
one square kilometer can be purchased for as little as $10.00 and quickly 
downloaded to that same smart phone. (See Figure 9) 
i) Thermal Infrared (TIR) imagery from Landsat can be overlain on higher resolution 
imagery for operational monitoring. (See the example in Figure 10) 
j) Multi-resolution synergy from combining lower resolution with high resolution 
imagery now provides increased opportunities for new information extraction (See 
Figure 11). 
k) High resolution imagery via the various virtual globes is now available for practically 
any point on earth (and in nearly all cases is also less than a year old). 
l) Historical imagery layering became available on Google Earth in version 5.0 in 2009 
(this is a critical resource for monitoring construction and other activities over time). 
m) Google Earth Engine now provides the means for rapid review and access to all 
Landsat imagery and data (including Thermal Infrared that is most significant 
for verification purposes). 
n) Commercial satellite imagery vendor historical imagery archive search capabilities 
provide an instant source of entire constellations’ archives in useable form, albeit in 
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degraded low resolution, for rapid large-scale change detection purposes (e.g., 
detecting the presence of new roads, large excavations, and large new buildings). 
o) Google Earth and Google Maps now include 3D modeling layers that have been auto-
generated for areas imaged from aircraft (as opposed to the previously more limited 
number of individually created buildings created with SketchUp). (See Figure 20)   
p) Given the availability of high resolution off-nadir imagery that is now provided by 
more agile satellite systems, 3D modeling of the entire terrestrial surface of the 
earth is now feasible. (See Figure 21) 
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Appendix D: A Note of Caution Concerning the Use of 
LANDSAT Thermal Infrared (TIR) Imagery 
LANDSAT TIR imagery, because it is acquired only in daylight, is subject to 
generating false positives in areas of high solar thermal loading.  Primary examples are 
sandy areas, such as beaches and sandbars in rivers.  Figure 22 illustrates how this can 
be a problem in some cases, and why, ideally, TIR imagery from future satellites should 
be acquired during nighttime hours.  
 
The three images A, B, and C, respectively, show LANDSAT TIR imagery of the 
Yongbyon reprocessing building, the Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, and a 
cordoned sandy triangular space (that was formerly used as a naval bombing target 
range) at the US Naval Base at Coronado near San Diego, California.  While the first two 
images are more likely due to internal heating of the associated buildings, the third 
image displays similar features arising from thermal loading of a sandy triangular area. 
The variation in temperature values is due to interpolation of the TIR pixels and nearest 
neighbor comparisons that parallel the perimeter boundaries and show the highest 
relative temperature in the center of the triangle. The reality is more likely equal 
temperatures over most of the light toned sandy area which is enclosed by a triangular 
perimeter wall. Moreover, the TIR images have been re-sampled which can also cause 
additional false positive interpretations. 
 
"Cubic convolution interpolation, or resampling, yields a rectified image that is generally 
smooth in appearance and is used if the final product is to be analyzed visually. However 
since it gives pixels on the display grid with brightnesses that are interpolated from the 
original data, it is not recommended if classification is to follow since the new brightness 
values may be slightly different from the actual radiance values measured by the 
sensors."197 
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A
B
C
Yongbyon Reprocessing Plant, DPRK
Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Plant, DPRK
Coronado Naval Air Station, San Diego, CA, USA
Map data ©2015 Google, 
Imagery © 2015, 
DigitalGlobe,
Sanborn, 
U.S. Geological Survey, 
USDA Farm Service Agency
©2015 Skybox
©2015 Skybox
Figure 22: A Note of Caution when using LANDSAT Thermal Infrared Imagery. The three images 
A, B, and C, respectively, show LANSAT TIR imagery (overlain on SkySat EO imagery) of the 
Yongbyon reprocessing building, DPRK, the Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, DPRK, and a 
cordoned sandy triangular space (that was formerly used as a naval bombing target range) at the 
US Naval Base at Coronado near San Diego, California.  While the first two images are more likely 
due to internal heating of the associated buildings, the third image displays similar features 
artificially arising from thermal loading of a sandy triangular area. The variation in temperature 
values is due to interpolation of the TIR pixels and nearest neighbor comparisons that parallel the 
perimeter boundaries and show the highest relative temperature in the center of the triangle. 
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List of Abbreviations and Definitions  
CIA:   The US Central Intelligence Agency 
EO:  Electro-Optical imaging sensor systems (passive) that obtain imagery 
in the visible and near visible infra-red region of the electromagnetic 
spectrum 
ESA:  The European Space Agency 
ESRI:  Environmental Systems Research Institute) is a US based international 
supplier of Geographic Information System (GIS) software, web GIS 
and geodatabase management applications 
GEOINT:  Geospatial Intelligence 
GIS:  Geographic Information System, a system designed to capture, store, 
manipulate, analyze, manage, and present all types of spatial or 
geographical data 
GPS:  Global Positioning System 
GSD:  Ground Sample Distance or the resolution/pixel determined by the 
distance covered on the ground between the center of each pixel in a 
satellite's sensor array 
HD:  High Definition quality, as is commonly applied to video imagery, 
nominally having a resolution of 720 or 1080 horizontal scan lines per 
sensor array 
HVAC:  Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning equipment and systems  
IAEA:  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM:  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IRS:  The Indian Remote Sensing satellite suite 
ISMA:  The proposed, but never instituted, International Satellite Monitoring 
Agency 
ISS:  The International Space Station 
IT:  Information Technology 
ITU:  The Institute for TransUranium elements, an institute located with the 
JRC 
JRC:  The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 
KH:  "Keyhole" is the nominative term applied to US space based 
reconnaissance systems during the Cold War. 
MWIR:  Mid-Wave Infrared, the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum 
between 3 and 5 microns, most often used to study emitted thermal 
radiation in the dark of night.  
NCRI:  The National Council for the Resistance of Iran, and Iranian dissident 
group that provided significant tip-offs on clandestine nuclear facilities 
in Iran beginning in 2002 
NGO:  Non-Governmental Organization 
NIIRS:  The US National Imagery Interpretation Ratings Scale that is used as a 
basis to determine the quality of an image. 
NIR:  Near infrared, the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum between 
0.7 and 1.1 microns 
OSINS:  Open Source Information and Analysis for Nuclear Security, a project 
funded by the European Commission to monitor nuclear related open 
source information and to perform technical analyses on selected 
nonproliferation issues for supporting European Union institutions. 
PIXEL:  Picture Element, the individual digital imaging sensor that makes up a 
two dimensional imaging array  
SAM:  A Surface to Air Missile 
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SAR:  Synthetic Aperture Radar active imaging systems that can be used to 
create images of the earth’s surface in all weather conditions, day or 
night. 
SIAU:  The Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency 
SPOT:  Système Pour l’Observation de la Terre ("Satellite for observation of 
Earth"), the satellite system now operated by the French firm, Airbus 
Industries Defence and Space 
SST:  The UK firm, Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. 
SWIR:  Short Wave Infrared, the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum 
between 1.1 and 3 microns 
TIR:  Thermal Infrared imaging sensors (passive) that derive imagery from 
within the thermal infra-red regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
between 8 and 15 microns 
TM:  The Thematic Mapper, a multi-spectral imaging sensor on US 
LANDSATs 4 & 5 operated between 1982 and 2013 having a 30-meter 
resolution (and prior to February 25, 2010: a thermal Band 6=60 
meters) 
UF6:  Uranium Hexafluoride 
UHD:  Ultra High Definition quality, as is commonly applied to video imagery, 
nominally having a resolution of 2000 to 4000 horizontal scan lines 
per sensor array 
UNOSAT: The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) 
Operational Satellite Applications Programme 
Wi-Fi:  a local area wireless computer networking technology 
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